


JPRS-TND-94-015

22 July 1994



**FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE**

JPRS Report

Proliferation Issues

PROLIFERATION ISSUES

JPRS-TND-94-015

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22 July 1994

[This report contains foreign media information on issues related to worldwide proliferation and transfer activities in nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, including delivery systems and the transfer of weapons-relevant technologies.]

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SOUTH AFRICA

Alleged Mossad Connection to Death of South African

*MB0907135594 Johannesburg WEEKEND STAR
in English 9-10 Jul 94 p 1-2*

[Article by Steve McQuillan]

[Text] The spectre of the ultimate weapon—a pocket-sized nuclear bomb—might have been behind the bizarre death in Johannesburg of paint technologist Alan Kidger.

His dismembered body was found in the boot of his luxury car in Soweto in November 1991.

Police believe Kidger was killed by Mossad, the Israeli secret service, because he was shipping a consignment of a substance called red mercury to a Middle Eastern country. Investigators believed at the time that the substance had a nuclear application.

But the full implications of this deal emerged only yesterday, following Weekend Star investigations around the world.

Red mercury, whose precise application has mystified scientists for years, may be the key component of leading-edge technology that permits the miniaturisation of nuclear bombs.

According to last month's issue of the International Defense Review, red mercury is a unique and top-secret compound that simplifies the building of nuclear weapons. Although not in itself a conventional explosive, it serves as a high-energy catalyst apparently capable of triggering nuclear fusion.

And that, in turn, according to the magazine, could lead to the creation of nuclear devices of only 2 kg—but still powerful enough to obliterate a city centre.

Reports continue to emanate from Russia about the existence of red mercury. But, officially, Western governments dismiss red mercury as a hoax. However, a few eminent Western physicists are becoming convinced that red mercury exists.

Gwynne Roberts, a British-based television director, has spent two years investigating red mercury. He has made two documentaries on the subject for Channel 4's Dispatches programme.

His extensive inquiries around the world led him to one conclusion: "It exists. We've so many documents; so many clues; so much compelling evidence, that we're sure red mercury has a very serious application. It's a very advanced technology.

"If this technology is as we think it is, the Israelis particularly would be very sensitive of red mercury." Roberts says that with pure fusion, nuclear bombs as small as a basketball can be built.

Military analyst Dr Frank Barnaby, who worked on the British nuclear bomb programme in the 1950s and was head of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, is convinced red mercury is part of a new, secret nuclear technology. He spelt out his reasoning in last month's International Defense Review.

Also convinced is Dr Sam Cohen, regarded as the father of the neutron bomb. "He's independently established the connections through his own sources," says Roberts.

Cohen says red mercury is part of a new explosive technology called ballotechnics. He believes Russia has developed a pure-fusion weapon using this technology. The Americans are trying to do the same. Earlier this year, according to Roberts, US scientists held a classified seminar at Los Alamos, New Mexico, on ballotechnics, including the uses of red mercury.

Principally based on mercury antimony oxide ($\text{Hg}_2\text{Sb}_2\text{O}_7$), red mercury is believed to be able to generate colossal explosive energy, which in turn triggers a nuclear explosion.

Roberts says red mercury exists in various forms. The powder version is the least expensive. Its value rockets, however, once it has been processed into a gel which is slightly radioactive. It is the gel, charged with other substances, that is used for nuclear weapons.

"It's the gel that's rare and very difficult to get hold of—and the more likely reason why Kidger was killed."

Article Views History of Military Relations With Israel

*MB0907170994 Johannesburg WEEKEND STAR
in English 9-10 Jul 94 p 6*

[By Brendan Serry]

[Text] Military co-operation between South Africa and Israel has gone on for decades, and may still be continuing.

According to the Norwegian publication, World Campaign, the SAAF [South African Airway Forces] and Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI), signed a secret deal earlier this year to upgrade 12 single-seat Cheetah fighter aircraft. The publication claimed that IAI would fit more powerful engines to the Cheetah, which is related to Israel's Kfir fighter which was developed out of the French-built Mirage.

The deal, which is worth about R6 billion [Rand], includes provision for an Israeli electronic company, Elta, to fit a radar fire control system similar to that used in the Israeli air force frontline Lavi fighter, claimed the publication.

The Louis Trichardt air base, said to be the centre of the development testing of joint SA-Israeli technologies, is one of the tightest security installations in this country.

Over the years, the co-operation in military hardware development has included:

- The R4 and R5 rifles, which are now the standard issue weapon for the SA National Defence Force, were copies of Israel's Galil assault rifle, which was developed from the AK47 and uses Nato standard 5.56mm ammunition.
- The Olifant tank, which saw service in the Angolan fighting. Based on the shell of the British Centurion tank, the Olifant was developed with the help of Israeli armour engineers, who had done a similar project for the Israeli Army. The Centurions were originally acquired from India, which sold them to middle men in Europe as scrap. They were then diverted to South Africa.
- The SA Navy's Minister class strike craft, which are an Israeli design based on earlier French plans and which were later made under license in Durban.
- The SA Navy's surface-to-surface missiles with which the strike craft are equipped, are Israeli-made Gabriels.
- The SAAF's Cheetah fighter was developed with the help of Israeli engineers who were involved in the Kfir project in their own country.
- The Kukri air-to-air missile fitted to the SAAF's Mirages is an Israeli weapon in all but name.
- Israel's Shavit and Jericho Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles were tested at the De Hoop firing range in the Cape in the '80s and early '90s. With a greater range and accuracy than the Scuds used in the Gulf War, these weapons were used as the basis for South Africa's own missile development programme, which has since been converted to civilian applications. South African electronics firms were said by the United States authorities to have been involved in large-scale campaigns in that country in the 1980s to acquire and smuggle out electronic and microwave technology for use in the guidance systems of such missiles.

**PRC Spokesman Says 'No Nuclear Cooperation'
With DPRK**

*SK3006232594 Seoul KBS-1 Radio Network in Korean
2215 GMT 30 Jun 94*

[Text] PRC Foreign Ministry spokesman Wu Jianmin said that the United States has never asked China to preserve [pogwan] North Korea's used fuel rods.

Asked by reporters about THE NEW YORK TIMES report on the above, the spokesman, who is accompanying Premier Li Peng in Vienna, said that China had not received such a proposal as of that time.

Noting that there is no nuclear cooperation [haek hyo-mnyogi chonjaehaji annunda] between China and North Korea, he said that China has two goals in regard with the North Korean nuclear issue—to protect peace on the Korean peninsula and to denuclearize it.

He also said: China hopes the third round of U.S.-North Korean high-level talks and South-North summit talks will bring positive results [kungjongjogin kyolgwa].

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Expert Warns of Radiation Leak From DPRK Fuel Rods*SK2506093294 Seoul CHUNGANG ILBO in Korean 25 Jun 94 p 2*

[Text] It has been learned that since the nuclear fuel that North Korea recently removed from its five-megawatt experimental nuclear reactor in Yongbyon is coated with the alloyed magnesium (Magnox), it may leak radiation within two years if North Korea uses its present method of preservation.

In a closed seminar marking the inauguration of the Atomic Energy Control Center held at the Plaza Hotel in Seoul on 24 June, Professor Kim Pyong-ku, chief of the reactor development team of the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, noted that because the coating material Magnox is apt to erode in water, long-term preservation of Magnox-coated nuclear fuel in water—North Korea uses this method—may result in a leakage of radiation. He expressed his concerns about the problem as North Korea cannot but help reprocess the nuclear fuel rods within two years, and insisted that those nuclear fuel rods must be resealed and kept dry permanently or must be disposed of for good all under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

MINJU CHOSON Denounces South's Nuclear Arms Development*SK2806051594 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0457 GMT 28 Jun 94*

["Nuke Development is Impermissible"—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang, June 28 (KCNA)—The South Korean authorities' nuclear arms development can never be allowed, stresses MINJU CHOSON today.

Describing the June 23 memorandum of the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland as an indictment of their development of nuclear weapons, the news analyst says:

The South Korean authorities have long since promoted the development of nuclear weapons, laying stress on the development of reprocessing facilities.

The post-irradiation test facility in the Taedok complex is a reprocessing facility under the veil of "test." The facility was completed in 1985 and put into full operation in 1987. With an investment of tens of billions of won, it has been expanded into a large one today.

The post-irradiation test facility, closely linked with the multi-purpose research reactor, forms a plutonium production system. Its danger is increasing still further.

In South Korea, insufficiently spent nuclear fuel discharged from the heavy water reactor and the multi-purpose research reactor is systematically reprocessed at the post-irradiation test facility to extract plutonium. A total of 50 kg of plutonium has so far been extracted.

The South Korean authorities also scheme to import a large quantity of plutonium lawfully. The purpose of the development of a fast heavy water reactor they have promoted is the production and import of a large quantity of plutonium. When their development of a fast heavy water reactor faced strong opposition at home and abroad, they recently chose a remodeled light water reactor as the next-generation reactor. But this was intended to mislead public opinion.

Their development of nuclear weapons has got more undisguised these days.

The South Korean authorities must immediately give up the nuclear arms development and open to the public the truth of their nuclear arms development and apologize for it, as demanded by the Korean people and the world peace-loving people.

If they continue to proceed with nuclear weapons development, they will encounter stronger opposition from the home and foreign public and meet their doom.

CPRF Memorandum on ROK Nuclear Development*SK2406040194 Pyongyang Korean Central Broadcasting Network in Korean 2200 GMT 23 Jun 94*

[Text] A press conference was held at the People's Cultural Palace yesterday [23 June] in connection with the South Korean authorities' maneuverings for nuclear weapons development. Participating in the press conference were reporters from the publication and media organizations in Pyongyang, such as NODONG SINMUN, the Korean Central News Agency, the Korean Central Broadcasting Committee; foreign correspondents; and publication-related functionaries at various foreign embassies in our country.

At the press conference, Ho Hyok-pil, vice director of the Secretariat of the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland [CPRF], first of all, issued a memorandum of the CPRF exposing the truth that nuclear weapons development has been pushed for in South Korea.

The memorandum pointed out that South Korea has accelerated nuclear weapons development in a planned way and systematically abrogated the joint declaration on denuclearization, while possessing reprocessing facilities, and extracting and bringing in plutonium in an illegal way.

The memorandum pointed out as follows that South Korea's post-irradiation test facilities [chosahu sihom sisol] are reprocessing facilities disguised as experimental ones: Although South Korea is disguising the

post-irradiation test facilities in Taedok as peaceful atomic facilities, it can be confirmed by all data that they are reprocessing facilities. Above all, the post-irradiation test facilities have been built for reprocessing purposes. The post-irradiation test facilities are reprocessing facilities of extracting plutonium in terms of their structure and operational process.

South Korea is extracting plutonium directly from spent nuclear fuel by making use of post-irradiation test facilities. According to obtained data, the South Korean authorities extracted plutonium after taking 4 meter-long 2,148 nuclear fuel rods (12 bundles) to the post-irradiation test facilities at the atomic research center from the Kori No. 1 Power Plant alone on 24 May, 1985, in accordance with an agreement with the United States.

Nuclear material is being diverted in an undisguised way in South Korea. In cahoots with the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], the South Korean authorities have systematically reprocessed, and extracted huge amount of plutonium every year from, spent nuclear fuels—which they did not burn completely at, and extracted from, the heavy-water reactor and multi-purpose research reactor—after taking those fuels to the post-irradiation test facilities. The total amount of it is 50 kg according to the data—which have been rudimentally obtained—alone.

The memorandum pointed out that South Korea is trying to legalize the introduction of plutonium from abroad and bring it in in large quantity. The memorandum pointed out as follows that the South Korean authorities have created artificial obstacles to the implementation of the joint declaration of the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, which the North and South sides adopted and effectuated, reflecting the unanimous aspirations and wishes of all countrymen: The present South Korean authorities have launched maneuverings of abrogating the North-South joint declaration of denuclearization in a planned and systematic way. Meanwhile, they are even advocating the theory of nuclear sovereignty and that of counter-nuclear development [taeung haekgaebalnon].

The South Korean authorities ought to scrap the post-irradiation test facilities—the reprocessing facilities—while making public the plutonium which they have illegally obtained.

We present—and strongly protest against—to the above-board public opinion of the world the fact that the IAEA is applying a double standard. He made remarks on the issuance of the memorandum. He said that the Board of Governors of the IAEA adopted a resolution on 10 June for discontinuing the agency's cooperation with our Republic, adding that this is a wanton infringement upon our Republic's sovereignty, an unfair act, and an integrated expression of the agency's application of a double standard.

He pointed out that those who have pushed for nuclear armament [haekmujanghwa] on the Korean Peninsula are the South Korean authorities.

He laid bare that the post-irradiation test facilities in the Taedok Complex in South Korea are extracting plutonium from those facilities, while saying that they are the reprocessing facilities of extracting plutonium in a thorough-going way in view of the purpose of their introduction, structure, and of the process of realistic diversion.

He also pointed out that South Korea has illegally brought in huge amount of plutonium from abroad, exposing that it is applying spurs to the development of a fast-breeder reactor today to make its introduction of plutonium legal.

He stressed: Nonetheless, the IAEA has never taken issue with this. We bring a charge against the agency's unjustness to the public opinion of the world.

At the press conference, Vice Director Ho Hyok-pil and (Paek Hyon-su), a responsible researcher for the fatherland's reunification, answered the questions raised by reporters.

They said that South Korea, which is said to undergo the IAEA's inspections, is extracting plutonium through the post-irradiation test facilities, adding: The IAEA has conducted more than 2,000 cases of inspections on the average every year since the Nonnuclear Proliferation Treaty took effect. This notwithstanding, the agency has never exposed even a single case of the nuclear materials being used for military purposes.

They said: In particular, the IAEA has conducted nuclear inspections of South Korea. But, it has turned its face away from South Korea's nuclear weapons development and even from its introduction of nuclear raw materials [haek wollyo].

They stressed: The South Korean authorities have intentionally publicized to the public that all of their attempts for nuclear weapons development up until now have been given up. This is nothing but a smoke screen to cover up their nuclear armament.

They disclosed: The world's social circles strongly call for exposing, and taking issue with, the maneuverings for nuclear armament in South Korea. Because even those inside South Korea have begun exposing the authorities' maneuverings for nuclear weapons development since last year, the South Korean authorities have been put in an awkward situation and have placed the public opinion under their sway in a deceitful way with a view to coping with this.

They pointed out in a concrete way: Because their development of a fast-breeder reactor has faced strong protests and denunciations at home and abroad, the South Korean authorities are trying to bring in plutonium by any means [kioko] under the pretext of developing an improved light-water reactor; and have invited an agency team for inspections and safety examination

to cover up their relations of conspiracy with the IAEA and to continue to apply spurs to their nuclear armament behind the scenes of conspiracy.

In conclusion, they said emphatically: It is necessary to raise the voice of justice, on a world-wide scale, of denouncing the South Korean authorities' maneuverings for nuclear weapons development.

JAPAN

Government Approves Rejecting Excess Plutonium Possession

OW2406062694 Tokyo KYODO in English
0542 GMT 24 Jun 94

[Text] Tokyo, June 24 a government panel on Friday [24 June] approved a long-term plutonium use program that rules out the manufacturing and possession of plutonium in a greater amount than needed for its nuclear power generation, officials said.

The peaceful plutonium use program received approval by the Atomic Energy Commission, the nation's highest nuclear policy-formulating panel, headed by Science and Technology Agency Director General Mikio Omi, they said.

To this end, the committee decided to defer a plan to start the operation of a projected second plutonium extraction plant until after 2010, when it was originally scheduled to start up. The second plant is only on the drawing board, with its construction site undecided.

Completion of the second extraction plant would increase Japan's plutonium production capability beyond that of an extraction plant now under construction at the village of Rokkasho in Aomori Prefecture, they said.

The Rokkasho factory is Japan's first plutonium extraction facility that will start producing plutonium in 2001.

The officials said the new program was officially adopted to eliminate international anxieties that Japan may divert excess plutonium into atomic weapons production.

On top of its compliance with safeguards obligations to accept regular, unimpeded checks by international atomic energy agency monitors, Japan will never exchange nuclear technologies with countries other than Britain, France, Germany and the United States to prevent nuclear arms proliferation, the report says.

The report, adopted by the commission Friday, says the government will make policy decisions around 2010 concerning the extraction capacity and technology for use in the planned second extraction plant.

The program calls for burning plutonium from Japan's existing nuclear reactors at a few light water-type nuclear reactors for electricity generation, starting in the latter half of the 1990s, the report says.

Japan now entrusts British and French extraction plants with extracting plutonium from its nuclear reactors.

The number of light water-type nuclear reactors that will use plutonium as part of its fuel will be increased to more than 10 by 2010 to consume an increased amount of plutonium coming from the Rokkasho plant, it says.

However, Japan will not scrap its basic nuclear policy of counting on "nuclear fuel cycle" for its future electricity needs, the report says.

Nuclear fuel cycle refers to electricity-generation use of plutonium extracted from spent fuel rods downloaded from a nuclear reactor that is energized by enriched uranium.

In line with this basic stance, Japan will start building a "demonstrator" fast-breeder reactor (FBR) with the power generation capacity of 660,000 kilowatts at the onset of the 21st century, they said. It will be followed by construction of another FBR to be put into commercial use by 2030, they said.

The FBR, which generates electricity by burning plutonium, is known to produce more plutonium than it consumes.

The new decision to defer the planned operation of a second plutonium extraction plant will force Japan to store spent nuclear fuel downloaded from various reactors inside the premises of various nuclear power plants, the report says.

While storing the spent nuclear fuel in the nuclear plants for the time being, Japan will consider how to more effectively store the spent nuclear fuel that will accumulate in coming years, according to the report.

Japanese Exports of Atomic Plant Parts to DPRK Increasing

SK1407105294 Seoul MUNHWA ILBO
in Korean 14 Jul 94 p 9

[Text] It has been learned that Japan exported to North Korea 1,127 million yen worth of reactors, boilers, machines, and parts (belonging to the HS goods class no. 2 [as published]) for nuclear power plants from the beginning of this year to the end of May.

According to Japanese trade statistics obtained and released by the Korea Trade Association on 14 July, Japanese exports of nuclear power plant machinery and parts have increased since the beginning of this year; these items rank first among exports to North Korea, with a total export amount exceeding that of cars.

In 1989, Japan exported 6,934 million yen worth of nuclear power plant machinery and parts to North Korea, establishing a record. It exported 5,886 million yen worth of parts to North Korea in 1990, down 15.1 percent from 1989, and 6,627 million yen worth in 1991, up 12.6 percent from the year previous.

In 1992, Japanese exports of these items to North Korea amounted to 5,244 million yen, down 20.9 percent; in 1993, such exports amounted to 3,044 million yen, down another 42 percent. However, the total amount of exports during the period from January through May 1994 was up three percent from the same period last year. These goods have emerged as main items being exported to North Korea.

In spite of a rapid decrease in both Japanese exports to and imports from North Korea since the beginning of this year, exports of nuclear power plant machinery and parts have been on the increase over the past three years, and these items have emerged as the main items being exported to North Korea. This reflects North Korea's ambition to develop nuclear weapons.

NORTH KOREA

Weekly Assesses DPRK Nuclear War Preparations

SK2906121094 Seoul CHUGAN CHOSON in Korean
30 Jun 94 pp 26-28

[Article by Reporter U Chong-chang]

[Text] North Korea has been learned to be building "an Integrated Command Post for Nuclear Warfare" near Pyongyang at Mt. Chidang with plans to finish construction within this year, and that it has obtained a U.S. Armed Forces' field manual on nuclear and chemical-biological-radioactive [CBR] warfare to prepare for nuclear and CBR warfare.

At the end of October 1993, North Korea also conducted "a mock experiment to observe a nuclear explosion" in the presence of nuclear development experts in Yomso-gol, Sokam-ri, Pyongwon County, South Pyongan Province. North Korea has been learned to have extracted plutonium at the kilogram level—much more than North Korea has reported to the International Atomic Energy Agency—and stashed it away in a "secret place" beyond the Yongbyon area.

This fact became apparent in the process of reinvestigating Mr. Yi Chung-kuk, 26, who defected to the ROK last March. The authorities think that Mr. Yi's information is highly reliable on the basis of a comprehensive evaluation of the details in his remarks and of his previous career as a sergeant, first class, at the computation section of the "Anti-Nuclear/Anti-Atomic Analysis Team" under the "Nuclear-Chemical Defense Bureau," a key North Korean agency for nuclear development. The government is making a scrupulous analysis of the status of North Korea's nuclear development on the basis of this information.

Born in Hwachon, Yanggang Province, Mr. Yi was enlisted in the Army when he was a senior at the Department of Biochemistry of the Faculty of Biology,

Pyongsong College of Science, one of North Korea's prestigious colleges of science. The agency where he served is under the direct control of the General Staff of the Ministry of People's Armed Forces. With a degree from a college of science, a good command of English, and highly proficient in operating computers, he was analyzing major documents of various kinds related to nuclear development and was translating foreign magazines at the agency. The authorities judge that Mr. Yi was, therefore, may have had access to top-class North Korean information on their nuclear development. Having served in the Army for three years, Mr. Yi fled to Yanbian, China, in November 1993 by crossing the Yalu River and defected to the ROK.

In the process of an investigation by the authorities' concerned, Mr. Yi disclosed: "North Korea has already begun building 'an Integrated Command Post for Nuclear Warfare' in preparation against nuclear warfare."

According to Mr. Yi, in a plenary meeting of the party cadres of the People's Army held at the beginning of December 1992, Choe Kwang, chief of General Staff of the Ministry of People's Armed Forces said: It has been decided that we will finish the construction of "the Nuclear Watch Guard Post" at Solbong of Cheyukchon, Angol of the Mangyongdae District, Pyongyang, by 1993. "The Integrated Command Post for a Nuclear Warfare" will be built at Mt. Chidang in Changsan-dong, Sosong District of Pyongyang by 1994.

Mr. Yi said: In accordance with this decision, construction of "the Nuclear Watch Guard Post" began in May 1993 and was scheduled for completion by November 1993. The construction of "the Integrated Command Post for a Nuclear Warfare" is now underway.

Mr. Yi said that "such a movement is in accordance with Kim Il-song's teachings and Kim Chong-il's orders."

In his 1990 teaching, Kim Il-song said: "Since we do not know when the United States may ignite a nuclear war, we should make thorough preparations against this. A recent nuclear test in China is affecting Choson's (North Korea) skies. We should intensify monitoring of radioactivity and conduct a contamination check-up in the Pyongyang area."

In the same year, Kim Chong-il gave an order by saying: "We, too, should prepare against emergency nuclear warfare by introducing the advanced countries' nuclear technologies at an early date."

According to the result of a study by the authorities, North Korea is known to have conducted a mock experiment to observe a nuclear explosion under the supervision of the "Nuclear-Chemical Defense Bureau" which is under the direct control of the General Staff of the Ministry of People's Armed Forces at the end of October 1993. It is said that about 50 people, including about 30 bureau directors (general-level officers equal in rank to

ROK's major general-level officers) under the General Staff; general-level officers of the Kim Il-song Military University; and those from the "Nuclear/Chemical Defense Bureau," such as director of the Reconnaissance Department, director of the Machine Supplies Department, first deputy director of the bureau, director of the Analysis Office, chief of the Computation Section, and all staff of the Machine and Equipment Manufacturing Section, were in attendance for the experiment that was conducted in Yomsogol, Sokam-ri, Pyongwon County, South Pyongan Province.

It is said that along with North Korea's preparations against a nuclear war, this mock experiment was conducted at the same time as a test of the performance of "equipment that automatically monitors nuclear explosion," which North Korea made with its own technology in early 1993. The experiment was conducted in such a way as to explode "a mock experimental bomb set for a nuclear explosion" and observe its explosive sound, the flash of light, heat, and the formation of a mushroom cloud. In July 1992, one year before such a mock experiment was conducted, North Korea reportedly sent three officers to Russia and the Ukraine, such as the director (a senior colonel) of the Machine Supplies Department of the "Nuclear/Chemical Defense Bureau," the chief (a lieutenant colonel) of the Machine Supplies Section of "the Anti-Nuclear/Anti-Atomic Analysis Team," and an interpreter (a lieutenant colonel) of the 15th Bureau of the Ministry of People's Armed Forces (the bureau is responsible for the import of equipment). During their one-month stay, they took a firsthand look at nuclear tests conducted in Russia and the Ukraine, and inspected nuclear weapons and chemical warfare equipment. They observed one nuclear test in Russia, and two tests in the Ukraine.

They videotaped the scenes of the three nuclear explosions and also tested the performance of the North Korean-made "equipment for automatically monitoring nuclear explosions," whose results have been reported to O Chin-u, minister of People's Armed Forces, and Choe Kwang, chief of the General Staff.

At that time, Russian President Yeltsin ordered that a nuclear explosion test not be conducted in light of his country's diplomatic relations with the United States. But, it is learned that the Russian military conducted the test in secret without even reporting this to President Yeltsin. It is also said that the Russian military officials involved in the nuclear test even gave a strict order to the North Korean observers that the test itself be kept in absolute secrecy. Mr. Yi disclosed that he came to know about this while he was preparing a report about the results of the above team's observation of the nuclear tests in accordance with an order from the director of the Machine Supplies Department of the "Nuclear/Chemical Defense Bureau."

Later, North Korea is known to have sent nuclear experts of the "Nuclear/Chemical Defense Bureau" to seven countries, such as Russia, France, Austria, and the

Ukraine, and to have had them observe nuclear facilities in those countries, and purchase the parts necessary for North Korea's nuclear development. Because of this, it is learned that the director of the Machine Supplies Department of the "Nuclear/Chemical Defense Bureau" and the chief of the Machine and Equipment Manufacturing Section of the "Anti-Nuclear/Anti-Atomic Analysis Team" went abroad again from December 1992 to March 1993.

The authorities confirmed afresh this time that North Korea has secretly obtained U.S. Armed Forces field manuals on preparations against nuclear and chemical, biological, and radiological warfare; and has made a scrupulous analysis of those manuals. This seems to be proof that North Korea is preparing against a nuclear war and a chemical, biological, and radiological war. It is learned: After secretly obtaining such manuals through the departments of operational activities at the party headquarters in the beginning of 1990, North Korea has kept them at a secret archives of the party headquarters which is located in the vicinity of the Koryo Hotel in Pyongyang.

Mr. Yi, who was translating them, testified: "In around September 1992, only two of us, including me and the director of the Reconnaissance Department (a senior colonel)—who was my immediate supervisor—entered the secret archives and loaned the manuals out. One official at the secret archives asked us to do our utmost to keep them in secrecy because the manuals had been obtained with difficulty by operatives of the party headquarters. The manuals, which he took out from the archives, totaled about 20 in number. The director of the Reconnaissance Department ordered me to translate five manuals. Since then, I had been alone in translating for five months until February 1993 at a clothing storage house in the Analysis Team Compound which is an off-limits area."

The military manuals, which North Korea has obtained, are confirmed to include "NBC (nuclear, biological, and chemical) Handbook," which U.S. servicemen carry in ordinary times; "NBC Ground Influence"; and "NBC Flame Influence." These military field manuals are confirmed to be latest editions which were published in 1986, 1988, and 1989 respectively.

Included in these manuals are varieties of guns and aircraft of the U.S. Armed Forces which are used for nuclear warfare and chemical warfare; varieties and data of U.S. Armed Forces chemical warfare weapons; effects of nuclear warfare and chemical and germ warfare; and the duties and tactics of commanding officers.

It has also been confirmed in a concrete way that North Korea has extracted plutonium by the kilogram and stashed it away at a third "secret place" other than the Yongbyon area, thereby being hellbent on nuclear development. This is revealed in detail in dialogue between high-ranking officers of the "Nuclear/Chemical Defense Bureau" of North Korea.

The following is part of the "conversation" they had:

Chief of the Reconnaissance Department Senior Colonel Hwang Chong-pyong: When we received an inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] in June 1992 we made a false report to the IAEA inspection team that we had extracted nine grams of plutonium. The inspection team sensed that we were making a false report. However, it returned back, unable to find evidence of our false report. The amount of the plutonium we extracted was an amount in kilograms which exceeded by far that of grams.

Chief of the Computation Section: The amount of a kilogram is a considerable amount. Chief of The 55th Center: We blocked up streams and set wire entanglements there. We built underground tunnels. Thus, we are manufacturing nuclear weapons there.

Chief of the Computation Section: In the course of our nuclear weapons development we received assistance from Russia, France, and China. But, we are now behaving very cautiously because of the United States.

In their current investigations our authorities concerned confirmed again that in its nuclear weapons development course North Korea had received technological assistance from foreign countries, including Russia. In particular, our authorities confirmed the fact that North Korea had invited the former Soviet Union's nuclear experts on one hand and sent to the former Soviet Union North Korean students from the Atomic Energy Department of Kim Il-song University and the graduate school of Yonghyon College of Physics to study nuclear technology on the other hand.

Defector Yi revealed that in 1991, after the collapse of the former Soviet Union, as an effort to accelerate its nuclear development North Korea invited Russian nuclear physicists secretly and accommodated them with villas located on the Yokchon riverside in Potonggang-kuyok, Pyongyang. He added: "I heard from Army officers that North Korea was receiving the assistance of nuclear experts from France, a nuclear big power."

Judging from these remarks by defector Yi, the authorities analyze that it was in 1981 that North Korea began to make active preparations to cope with a nuclear war and that in that year North Korea founded "the Nuclear-Chemical Defense Bureau" under the Office of the General Staff under the Ministry of People's Armed Forces and "the Anti-Nuclear/Anti-Atomic Analysis Team" under the direct control of the General Bureau of Security Guard and the Air Force Headquarters. The authorities also analyze that in 1985 North Korea founded the anti-nuclear/anti-atomic analysis teams in the Navy Headquarters and four corps stationed near the DMZ. In 1985 and thereafter, the anti-nuclear/anti-atomic analysis team was established in the corps in

the rear area, the 425th and 815th training centers, and other corps-level training centers.

"The Nuclear-Chemical Defense Bureau" has conducted training to cope with a nuclear war for responsible persons from the "anti-nuclear/anti-atomic analysis teams" once or twice a year since 1991. The training is conducted by colonel officers or senior colonel officers who are experts in this field. Since May of last year one set of automatic nuclear explosion observation devices [haekpokpal chadong kwangchukki] which was developed in North Korea has been issued to each of the heads of the anti-nuclear/anti-atomic analysis teams throughout the Army. Along with this, it has been learned that the Training Department of "the Nuclear-Chemical Defense Bureau" started constructing a nuclear-chemical general training site in Onjong-ri, Songchon County, South Pyongan Province in December 1992.

The names and locations of research institutes and organs reportedly involved in North Korean nuclear development have been revealed concretely. North Korea has atomic energy research centers in Yongbyon and Suncheon and a atomic power plant in Sinpo. Nuclear weapons development organs include the Atomic Energy Department of Kim Il-song University; the Physics Department of Kanggye Defense College; the metal science department under the Chemical Department of and the physics Research Institute of Pyongsong College of Science; the college of physics in Yongbyon atomic research center; and uranium mines in Kusong in North Pyongan province, unidentified place in North Hwanghae province, and Suncheon in South Pyongan province.

On the other hand, what draws our attention is the fact that China is providing "top" intelligence related to North Korea's nuclear development to our government. According to the authorities, early this year China founded in haste an organization called "The Korean Peninsula Research Team" in "The Research Institute on World Affairs," a government-run organization. "The Korean Peninsula Research Team" is a key organ which studies and analyzes exclusively the affairs on the Korean peninsula. There is also a research team which has the same name as this in the Academy of Social Science of China. An expert on the Korean affairs disclosed that such a deep interest by China in the Korean peninsula affairs is extremely unusual.

"The Korean Peninsula Research Team" of China provided through an unofficial channel the intelligence that "North Korea does not seem to possess nuclear bombs yet" to our government recently. China insisted that "it has obtained reliable intelligence that just before the collapse of the former Soviet Union North Korea attempted to purchase one nuclear bomb from the former Soviet Union, but in vain" and analyzed that "judging from this, North Korea does not possess

nuclear weapons as yet and North Korea's assertions regarding nuclear weapons are exaggerated considerably." The organizational chart of North Korean nuclear-chemical units:

The Ministry of People's Armed Forces (Defense Minister O Chin-u)

Office of the General Staff of the Korean People's Army

—(Chief: Choe Kwang)

Chemical Department

—Anti-Nuclear/Anti-Atomic Analysis Team

Nuclear-Chemical Defense Bureau

—Operations Department

—Training Department

—Technology Department

—Chemical-Biological-Radiological Research Center

2795th Research Center and Branches

—Political Department

—(?Tunnel Management Department)

—17th Nuclear-Chemical Defense Battalion

—18th Nuclear-Chemical Defense Battalion

—Nuclear-Chemical General Training Site

—Sariwon 815th Training Center

North Korea's bacteriological weapons-related organizations include Kim Il-song University, Pyongyang Medical College, Pyongyang Military Medical College, the Institute of Microbiological Diseases under the Pyongsong Academy of Science, the Bacterium Research Institute under the Second Academy of Natural Sciences.

North Korea's chemical weapons-related organizations include the Humhung branch of the Academy of Defense Science; Kim Il-song University; the Chemical Department of Pyongsong College of Science; the Chemical Research Institute under the Second Academy of Natural Science; the Central Analysis Center at Pyongsong Academy of Science; the 398th Research Center and the 279th plant under the Nuclear-Chemical Defense Bureau; the chemical plants in Kanggye, Sakchu, Hyesan, Wonsan, and Hamhung; the 8 February Vinalon Plant; Sunchon Vinalon Plant; and Sariwon Potash Fertilizer Plant.

North Korea's nuclear weapons-related organizations include the Atomic Energy Research Institute and College of Physics in Yongbyon; the Atomic Energy Research Institute in Suchon; the nuclear power plant in Sinpo; the Atomic Energy Department at Kim Il-song University; the Physics Research Institute at Pyongsong College of Science and the metal Science section under

the Chemical Department at Pyongsong College of Science; the Physics Department at the College of Defense in Kanggye; the uranium mine in Kusong, North Pyongan Province; and uranium mine in Sunchon, South Pyongan Province.

Envoy on Solution to Nuke Issue Through Package Deal

SK3006143794 Seoul KBS-1 Radio Network in Korean
1405 GMT 30 Jun 94

[By REUTER from Geneva]

[Text] A high-level North Korea-U.S. talk slated to be held in Geneva on 8 July will serve as a momentum in opening a road for a package deal which will eventually solve the problem on denuclearizing the Korean peninsula, said Han Chang, deputy representative of the North Korean mission to the United Nations in Europe.

Deputy Representative Han Chang, speaking before the International Arms Reduction meeting attended by 39 nations, stated that the high-level North Korea-U.S. talk will open new prospects for solving the problem of denuclearizing the Korean peninsula through a package deal settlement based on the principles.

Nuclear Issue Causes Decrease in PRC, DPRK Border Trade

SK2806023394 Seoul YONHAP in English
0210 GMT 28 Jun 94

[Text] Hong Kong, June 28 (YONHAP)—"Border trade" between North Korea and China took its steepest dive ever in the first five months of this year due to the North's nuclear issue and economic difficulties, the XINGDAO WANBAO reported Tuesday.

The evening newspaper reported from China's Jilin Province that border trade between Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture and North Korea, mostly barter trade, came to only 80,440 U.S. dollars in January-May, nosediving 46.1 percent from the same period last year.

The volume is only 15.5 percent of this year's goal, the paper quoted Kim Chong-su, chairman of the prefecture's Foreign Economic Relations and Trade Commission, as saying.

Yanbian's exports to North Korea amounted to 22.59 million dollars in the cited period, down 72.4 percent from the same months last year and reaching only 8.7 percent of this year's goal.

The paper attributed the unprecedented decrease in border trade to global economic pressure on Pyongyang caused by the controversy over its nuclear program, North Korea's shortage of commodities and energy, poor crops and nonfulfillment of trade contacts.

The paper said Beijing has been studying ways to prevent possible unease along the Chinese-North Korean border, noting that economic pressure by the international community could create problems.

Official Admits Possession of Plutonium for Research

SK2806015094 Seoul YONHAP in English
0141 GMT 28 Jun 94

[Text] Moscow, June 28 (YONHAP)—A senior North Korean official admitted that his country possesses plutonium for research purposes at a radiochemical laboratory in the Yongbyon nuclear complex, ITAR-TASS News Agency reported from Pyongyang on Monday.

In an interview with the Russian news agency, the North Korean Atomic Energy Committee's overseas bureau director, Choe Chong-sun, acknowledged that some plutonium was at the complex but did not elaborate on the total amount.

Choe is the first top North Korean official to admit to his country's possession of plutonium.

He reportedly said that despite Pyongyang's withdrawal from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the agency's monitoring equipment at Yongbyon is operating normally and stressed that North Korea will inform the IAEA if the equipment needs replacement.

As to cooperation with the U.N. nuclear watchdog, Choe said North Korea has no specific expectations "at present as well as in the past," disclosing that only \$500,000 was provided by the agency last year for agricultural and medical purposes.

The basic purpose of the Yongbyon nuclear reactor, constructed through close cooperation with Russia, is to secure the nuclear power generation necessary to develop the country's economy, he asserted. The existing 5-megawatt reactor is insufficient to meet domestic demand.

Although the former Soviet Union provided key assistance in building the reactor, he continued, North Korea does not hold out much hope that its successor Russia will do the same. He maintained that "there is almost no cooperation with Russia presently in the nuclear field."

KCNA Decries Japanese Premier's Remarks on Nuclear Capacity

SK2206052094 Pyongyang KCNA in English
0503 GMT 22 Jun 94

["Nuclear Design Revealed"—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang, June 22 (KCNA)—The Japanese Prime Minister, Tsutomu Hata, recently told the Budget Committee of the House of Councillors and the press group that Japan "has the capacity to possess nuclear weapons."

In this regard, NODONG SINMUN today says his remarks fully revealed Japan's policy of nuclear armament which has reached the danger line.

The analyst says:

The Japanese reactionaries have accelerated nuclear arms development in secrecy, concealing a large quantity of plutonium under the cloak of "three non-nuclear principles." As Hata admitted, Japan has made all preparations and has now the capacity to massproduce nuclear weapons any time it wants. The nuclear armament of Japan is a matter of time.

Japan intends to become a nuclear power and give vent to its bitter grievances for its past defeat, behaving like a big power, and revive its old empire. Now the Japanese ruling circles are claiming that the use of nuclear weapons is not contrary to the international law, thus revealing their intention to produce nuclear weapons and use them in overseas aggression. Their alleged "maintenance of the three non-nuclear principles" and "efforts for nuclear non-proliferation" are nothing but a smokescreen to cover up the nuclear armament of Japan.

Japan is the only A-bomb victim in the world. For such a country to seek nuclear armament, forgetful of the lesson, is a foolish act inviting a nuclear holocaust.

Envoy Cited on U.S., Nuclear Policy, Kim-Chong-il

OW1407014894 Tokyo KYODO in English
0130 GMT 14 Jul 94

[Text] New York, July 13 KYODO—North Korea's nuclear policy and its policy toward the United States will remain unchanged under the new regime following the death of President Kim Il-song, a senior official at the North Korean UN mission in New York said Wednesday [13 July].

The official, who asked not to be identified, said commitments made by the late president to former U.S. President Jimmy Carter are valid under the new regime.

The late North Korean leader told Carter, who visited Pyongyang in June to seek a peaceful solution to the nuclear standoff, North Korea would freeze its nuclear program on condition that the U.S. returns to the negotiating table for high-level bilateral talks.

Kim Il-song also called on the U.S. to provide it with technology for a light-water nuclear reactor, which produces less plutonium than the North's graphite-moderated reactor.

The third round of high-level talks between North Korea and the U.S. resumed in Geneva on Friday after one-year hiatus but was suspended the following day after Kim's death was announced.

The official said informal discussions between the two countries to resume the third round of talks will start next week in New York after Sunday's funeral for Kim.

The official called Kim's eldest son and heir Kim Chong-il as "great leader," the reference previously given only to the late president.

He said he has no information Kim Chong-il was formally elected general secretary of the Korean Workers' Party succeeding his father.

DPRK Ambassador in Almaty on Nuclear Issue

944K1764A Almaty KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 13 Jul 94 p 2

[Interview with DPRK Ambassador to Kazakhstan Yi Gil-nam by KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA correspondent Dinara Shugabayeva; place and date not given: "Pyongyang Does Not Intend To Build Nuclear Weapons. Said DPRK Ambassador to Kazakhstan Yi Gil-nam"]

[Text] The American-Korean negotiations have finally been resumed in Geneva. Because of their suspension, the DPRK nearly withdrew from the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. Because of this, almost all the mass media hinted at impending danger on the part of North Korea because of the assumed development of nuclear weapons there. KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA asked Mr. Yi Gil-nam, DPRK ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary, to explain the situation.

Shugabayeva: Mr. Ambassador, various mass media have reported that Pyongyang refused International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections of the facilities where nuclear reactors are installed, thereby violating the nuclear nonproliferation treaty it had signed. The reason for this behavior was the U.S. refusal to sit down at the negotiating table. Is this so, and what is it that Pyongyang and Washington cannot agree on?

Yi Gil-nam: The mass media interpreted the situation with the nuclear program on the Korean peninsula in different ways, mainly presenting Washington's view of it. You probably noticed that this one-sided information "boom" immediately subsided as soon as it became known that the United States would sit down at the negotiating table after all.

I must say that this panic in the public mind was created intentionally. Where do things stand in reality? In order to expand the national power generation base, the DPRK with its own resources and technology has built an experimental AES [nuclear power station], where everything—from beginning to end—is meant for peaceful purposes; we do not have either the capability or intention of developing nuclear weapons. We do not need weapons—one or two nuclear warheads will not solve anything anyway. On the contrary, our government is making a great effort to turn the country into a nuclear-free zone.

The nuclear issue essentially arose at the point when the United States brought to South Korea more than 1,000 nuclear warheads and turned the southern part of the peninsula into a strategic beachhead. This is a violation of two agreements reached by us first with the United States, and then with South Korea. Of course, Pyongyang

spoke out against this arbitrary action, especially considering that it did not receive any guarantees of nuclear nonaggression and protection from the United States. So if there is a nuclear threat hanging over anyone, it is the DPRK. And that is why the leadership of our country had to demand that a compromise decision be made between liquidation of the U.S. military base in South Korea and obtaining nuclear guarantees. And since the United States needed a pretext to keep the nuclear arsenal in the South of Korea, they began to systematically hype the situation around the North.

Shugabayeva: America advocated international sanctions against your country, and many states supported it in its resolve not to undermine the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Was this all unfounded?

Yi Gil-nam: Of course. At the AES that exists in the DPRK—its power is only 5 MW—it was necessary for technical reasons to replace a fuel rod. To certify the integrity of nuclear activities, we summoned IAEA observers five times by telex—and this is despite the fact that appropriate measuring devices are installed in the active zone, which keep everything under the international agency's monitoring anyway. After long delays, two inspectors arrived to the facility. They verified that nuclear substances were being used exclusively for peaceful purposes. As soon as they got back to the IAEA headquarters, the UN Security Council adopted its notoriously pretentious resolution, which indicated, among other things, the imposition of economic sanctions. It was clear that everything was proceeding according to a preset scenario.

Then the IAEA made a statement that it would stop cooperation with us unless we reach a peaceful settlement of the conflict. Then the DPRK MFA [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] in turn announced withdrawal from this organization, since what ensued was a virtual pressure campaign on the republic. President of the country Kim Il-song in an interview to Cuban television made it clear that it is not right to dance to the superpowers' tune and that international matters must be resolved on the basis of equality and justice, without interference in the internal political affairs of states. After this the United States proposed to us to resolve the conflicts peacefully, so we did not withdraw from the treaty but only took a special position, which did not impede IAEA inspection activities.

Another reason why there is an attempt to strangle the little country on the South Asian continent with economic sanctions is because it is an eyesore for the states who are today trying to trumpet the victory of the capitalist system. Because we still adhere to socialist ideas and are flourishing.

Shugabayeva: What was the DPRK's reaction to the Russian proposal to hold an eight-party international conference on the question of the nuclear problem on the Korean peninsula—which, by the way, was supported by the Kazakhstan MFA in its unprecedented statement?

Yi Gil-nam: Some countries, including Russia, rushed into this without giving serious thought to the fact that the crisis had emerged in the relations between two states—North Korea and the United States. There should be no third parties. In general, the nuclear problem ought to be resolved between Pyongyang and Seoul, but since South Koreans do not own the nuclear weapons on their territory, we have to conduct a dialogue with the United States.

Shugabayeva: Will a U.S. sanction also be needed for an envisaged peaceful unification of Korea?

Yi Gil-nam: Yes, because South Korea is virtually an American colony. The Soviet Union kept its word and withdrew its troops from our territory, while America, contrary to the undertaken obligations, maintained its military presence in Seoul. Actually, the same for some reason happened with respect to the Warsaw Pact and NATO. So far the United States does not object to Korean unification. But this should be proven in deed—by putting an end to expanding its military might in South Korea.

Shugabayeva: Some specialists on your region suggested the following: The DPRK, they say, wants to develop a nuclear bomb in order to make it a trump card at the time of unifying Korea into a single state. Do you have any counterarguments on this account?

Yi Gil-nam: Definitely. As is known, from 25 to 27 July a meeting of the presidents of South and North Korea will be held in Pyongyang—the first in 45 years since the war. In many respects it will be decisive for the future of the Korean people. The program for a great consolidation of the nation proposed by the DPRK does not give an advantage to either side and is drafted with the developments in the current international situation in mind. The creation of a confederative democratic republic of Korea envisages the existence of two systems and two governments within the framework of one nation and one state. The idea is to introduce the institution of cochairman in the Supreme Federal Assembly, where representatives of the two systems will take turns as supreme leaders. Provided that this time politicians are guided by love for their nation rather than something superficial, they can reach understanding.

As this material was being prepared for print, we learned the sad news: DPRK President Kim Il-sung has passed away. For this reason, at the request of Korean delegation the Geneva negotiations temporarily [line(s) missing].

Nuclear, Chemical Unit Participates in Gulf Naval Exercises

*LD1007121394 Tehran Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran First Program Network in Persian
0930 GMT 10 Jul 94*

[Text] A joint amphibious maneuver, codenamed Fajr [Dawn], started in the northern waters of the Persian Gulf this morning. Various units of the Islamic Republic Guard Corps (IRGC) navy as well as some units of the Islamic Republic of Iran's Navy and Air Force are participating in the maneuver.

The maneuver is taking place in four phases with the aim of carrying out joint amphibious exercises in the most satisfactory way, assessing the performance of the participating units, putting into practice the experience gained during the imposed war, transferring the experience and military knowhow of old personnel to the new, reviewing methods of guiding various units and their commanders' performance, and boosting the combat capability of the participating units.

Rocket-launching and logistic-combat vessels, amphibious attack vessels, marine brigades, the nuclear, chemical, and biological unit, the tools unit, rocket-launching naval units, attack and logistic vessels, and bomber and fighter aircraft belonging to the IRGC's second region, as well as the Air Force of the Islamic Republic of Iran's Army, are participating in the maneuver.

During the first phase of the maneuver, which was held this morning, the organization of the participating forces, the inspection of telecommunication wavelengths, the inspection of audio instruments, control of nuclear, chemical, and biological operations, and loading of instruments on personnel carriers and vessels were implemented.

During the second phase of the maneuver, tomorrow morning, operational forces will carry out reconnaissance operations on the hypothetical enemy, reaching the scene of the operation and the surrounding of the hypothetical enemy.

Unofficial Translation of Accord on N-S Presidential Summit

*SK2806123694 Seoul YONHAP in English
1225 GMT 28 Jun 94*

[Text] Seoul, June 28 (YONHAP)—Here is an unofficial translation of the agreement on an inter-Korean summit meeting reached at a South-North preliminary contact at Panmunjom Tuesday. The agreement was signed by the South's chief delegate Yi Hong-ku and his North Korean counterpart, Kim Yong-sun.

"A bilateral deputy-prime-minister-level preliminary contact to prepare for a South-North summit meeting was held at Panmunjom on June 28, 1994.

"At the contact the two sides agreed on the following items:

"The two sides decided to hold a South-North summit meeting in Pyongyang on July 25-27, 1994. The duration of stay may be extended if need be.

"A following meeting shall be decided on according to the will of both sides' top leaders.

"The composition and size of delegations to the South-North summit meeting, the format of meeting, itineraries, the dispatch of an advance team, procedures for travel back and forth, guarantee of conveniences, guarantee of personal safety and other working-level procedural matters shall be discussed and agreed on at a delegates contact consisting of one delegate to the preliminary contact and two attendants from each side.

"A delegates contact shall be held at 10 AM July 1 (Friday), 1994 at Tongilgak in the Northern area of Panmunjom.

"The two sides shall endeavor together to make good the atmosphere for the South-North summit meeting in the direction of promoting reconciliation, unity, confidence-building and understanding."

SOUTH KOREA

Dailies on Government Position on Summit

SK3006070194

[Editorial Report] The following is a compilation of reports and articles carried in Seoul vernacular newspapers on 30 June on the ROK Government's position and plans regarding the North-South summit to be held in Pyongyang from 25 to 27 July as agreed during the 28 June preliminary contact at Panmunjom.

The conservative CHOSON ILBO publishes on page 1 a 300-word report by Kim Chang-ki on remarks of relevant high-ranking government officials revealing President Kim Yong-sam's plan to take up the issue of "preventing a war from breaking out on the Korean peninsula and consolidating durable peace" as a top priority for the summit talks. The officials pointed out that "President Kim Yong-sam will give top priority to the issue of converting the present armistice status into a peace system, and discuss the issue of replacing the Armistice Agreement concluded between the UN Forces and the communist side with a peace agreement between the North and the South." The report writes that, according to the officials, this peace agreement will not be concluded during the Pyongyang summit, but will be turned over to working-level officials for further discussions. With a view to emphasizing observation of the North-South declaration for denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, President Kim Yong-sam "will repeatedly call for implementation of mutual nuclear inspections between the North and the South."

CHOSON ILBO also publishes on page 3 a 1,700-word article by reporter Kim Chang-ki entitled "The ROK Government's Position Toward North-South Summit." The article writes that although President Kim Yong-sam's ideas and plans regarding the summit have not been made public at all up to now, it is highly likely that he will discuss "the issue of peace on the Korean peninsula" with priority at the talks with Kim Il-song, judging from his repeated emphasis on this issue in the past. The article notes that President Kim Yong-sam's emphasis on peace is also related to his position that "the South will not attempt to unify the nation by absorbing the North." The article observes that President Kim Yong-sam's emphasis on prevention of war and maintaining peace has been prompted by his belief that as long as the war does not break out, time will advance "in our side's favor." Noting that President Kim Yong-sam is not planning, nor expecting any "concrete agreement" to be reached during the Pyongyang summit, the article refers to remarks of President Kim's close staff that the meeting between Kim Il-song, whom the North Korean people have worshipped as "the sun of the nation" for the past 50 years, and the ROK President, whom they regard as "a puppet of the U.S. imperialists" and as "a traitor of the nation," itself will give an "enormous shock" to their society. The article then points out that through forthcoming talks, President Kim Yong-sam will likely try to bring about a "symbolic agreement" on several issues including the nuclear issue, the issue of reunion of separated families, and the issue of economic cooperation and exchange. However, the most significant agreement that President Kim will likely push for would be "the establishment of a hot line between the top leaders of the North and the South."

CHOSON ILBO publishes on the same page a 1,000-word article by reporter An Hui-chang entitled: "North Korea's Intention Behind the Summit." The article writes that North Korean President Kim Il-song, who has been passive toward a North-South summit in the past, made this proposal this time "without any condition." The article analyzes the reasons behind this, stating that Kim's decision was prompted by the idea that the North Korean system can be maintained only by changing the existing strategy toward South Korea and by designating priority tasks of first, "securing the position as a potential nuclear power"; second, "improvement of relations with the United States"; and third, "relaxing confrontation with South Korea." Having achieved the first two goals, Kim Il-song has now turned up for a dialogue with the South. Another reason is that as ROK President Kim Yong-sam has repeatedly stressed that he will not adhere to national reunification through absorption, Kim Il-song might have wanted to hold a dialogue for reunification.

However, the article continues, one may draw a negative interpretation that all this is merely another form of North Korean strategy for "liberation of South Korea," and that by holding a summit in Pyongyang, Kim Il-song is trying to enhance North Korea's "legitimacy" and by

taking advantage of legitimacy, he may demand "abolition of the National Security Law" and "U.S. troop withdrawal." Besides, some observers analyze that "Kim Il-song responded to the summit in order to avoid international sanctions and to lay a stepping-stone for a package solution during the third round of North Korea-U.S. talks."

The moderate TONG-A ILBO publishes on page 1 a 1,000-word report on the government reviewing a plan to allow ROK businessmen to visit North Korea and small-scale North-South economic cooperation, if the top leaders of the two sides agree in a lightning manner on resumption of the North-South Nuclear Joint Control Committee. In addition, the government will allow full-scale North-South economic cooperation in the event that "positive progress is seen in North-South mutual nuclear inspections." The report continues, however, that the government will refrain from raising the "past issues," including the Korean war, to attain progress in talks. The government is also reviewing a plan to propose to the North Korean side the establishment of a hot line between military authorities of both sides. The article writes that when a North-South summit is realized, the government will drastically expand "the fund for North-South exchange and cooperation," which has reached 115.2 billion won up to present, to the scope of "one trillion won." TONG-A ILBO also publishes on page 3 a 1,600-word article by reporter Pak Chae-kyun entitled: "North-South Summit Dialogue—Seoul and Pyongyang Have Become Close." Noting that the first North-South summit will likely be held in Kumsusan Assembly Hall, President Kim Il-song's palace, in Pyongyang, the article writes that the ROK plans to propose that one delegate accompanies each top leader to the summit and that the North side is not expected to oppose this plan at present. The article continues that when President Kim Yong-sam visits a foreign country, he is usually accompanied by approximately 100 security guards, however, North Korea will not likely accept such a huge number of body guards. During the first-day talks with Kim Il-song, President Kim Yong-sam may raise "the issue of conducting mutual nuclear inspections between the North and the South, and resumption of the North-South Joint Nuclear Control Committee," as well as resumption of North-South high-level talks and of North-South joint committees. The issue of "opening a hot line between the North and the South" may also be discussed. Pointing to a possibility of Kim Il-song raising the issue of receiving support for light-water reactors, the article notes that the South side may express the position to affirmatively review the North Korean demand. The article also observes that "the result of North Korean-U.S. talks will have a great impact on the decision to hold a second round of the North-South summit" and that "when all this proceeds satisfactorily, the ROK Government will raise reunification methods, including formation of a North-South alliance."

TONG-A ILBO publishes on page 3 a 1,400-word article by reporter Kim Cha-su, under the headline: "The ROK Government Measures for the North Korean Nuclear Problem During the North-South Summit." The article stresses that although no concrete agenda items were designated for the summit, the North Korean nuclear issue should be discussed urgently at the summit. The government will likely urge the North Korean side to implement the joint declaration for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, and to agree on procedures and methods for North-South mutual nuclear inspections by resuming activities of the Joint Nuclear Control Committee. The government's efforts, concentrated on implementation of the joint denuclearization declaration, are intended to take the initiative in resolving the North Korean nuclear problem by overcoming the situation in which the ROK Government has been excluded from the discussion of the problem in the past.

The article refers to remarks of experts in North Korean affairs calling on the government to "raise the nuclear issue without fail during the North-South summit," because the building of genuine trust and realizing cooperation are impossible as long as suspicions of the North's nuclear program remain between the North and the South, and because North Korea may possibly express its position to "separate its nuclear issue from North-South relations." The article writes that "emphasis on North-South cooperation for the peaceful use of nuclear energy will help solve the North Korean nuclear problem."

The moderate KYONGHYANG SINMUN publishes on page 3 a 1,800-word article by reporter Yi Sung-chol entitled: "What Will Be Discussed During the North-South Summit." The article anticipates that since President Kim Yong-sam cannot ignore the people's aspirations to see "transparency of the North Korean nuclear problem," he may have to raise the North Korean nuclear issue first at the summit. Besides, in the event that President Kim does not raise this issue, the international community, including the United States, will certainly direct a suspicious eye toward the ROK Government, in view of his repeated emphasis that "he will not hold dialogue with North Korea if it possesses even a half of a nuclear weapon." The article points out the possibility of North Korea mentioning that the U.S. Forces in South Korea possess nuclear weapons and the Team Spirit exercise, branding it as nuclear war exercise, although the possibility of North Korea's mentioning its own nuclear problem is very slim. The article observes that the greatest factor deciding the degree of discussion of the North Korean nuclear problem is the third round of U.S.-North Korean high-level talks slated for 8 July in Geneva. The government's burden for the summit will be significantly reduced if measures are sought during U.S.-North Korean talks for ensuring North Korean nuclear transparency.

A ROK Government official pointed out that "the North Korean nuclear problem is so hot that the top leaders of the two sides may mention only its basic aspect. We

cannot rule out the possibility of this issue becoming a major point at the summit according to progress in North Korean-U.S. talks."

Poll Finds 80 Percent of South Koreans Think DPRK Has N-Bomb

*SK2706074694 Seoul YONHAP in English
0716 GMT 27 Jun 94*

[Text] Seoul, June 27 (YONHAP)—More than 80 percent of South Koreans believe that North Korea either possesses nuclear weapons or is capable of producing them while 66 percent feel that the North has sufficient military power to invade the South independently.

An opinion poll revealed Monday that 77.9 percent of the people believe that spies sent by Pyongyang are engaging in espionage in South Korea while 72 percent think the public awareness of national security has become slack.

The opinion survey was conducted by media research in May in the form of individual interviews with 1,000 adult men and women across the nation excluding Cheju Province.

According to the poll, 53.5 percent said the possibility of war on the Korean peninsula is high if the United States withdraws its forces from South Korea.

As to North Korea's nuclear development program, 82.1 percent replied that the North is either gearing up to produce nuclear weapons or already has them.

Queried on how to handle the nuclear issue, the respondents replied as following in order of percentage: Diplomatic and economic sanctions (45.2), nuclear development (22.9) and military countermeasures (5.8). Only 25.9 percent opted for settlement of the issue through dialogue.

With regard to national unification, 67.8 percent responded that it should be attained without fail while 32.4 percent preferred the status quo "if hostile activities are not made."

ROMANIA

Defense Council Reaffirms Commitment to Non-Proliferation

AU1307161194 Bucharest Radio Romania Network
in Romanian 1300 GMT 13 Jul 94

[Text] Today a meeting of the country's Supreme Defense Council took place under the chairmanship of President Ion Iliescu.

As the first issue on the agenda, they examined and sanctioned the reports of the National Defense Ministry, the Interior Ministry, and the Romanian Intelligence Service regarding the fulfillment of the 1993 equipment plan, as well as prospects for 1994.

They found that the 1993 activities in the field of equipment were intended to cover the urgent needs for equipment and the maintaining of the minimal production capacities in the defense industry. The council appreciates that the allotted funds were directed with priority to the important sectors in the domain of defense, public order, and national security.

For the year of 1994 the council sanctioned the goals established by the restructured equipment plans in compliance with the funds allotted from the budget. Taking into consideration that not all needs could be wholly covered, the council recommended that—as soon as additional financial resources are found—the Romanian Government should examine the possibility of augmenting the funds allotted from the budget for 1994.

In the same context they sanctioned the program of equipping the law-enforcement troops of the Ministry of Interior over 1994-1996 and the orientations until the year 2000. The program stipulates the ensuring of the principal categories of military technology, equipment, and specific devices, as well as the replacement of worn-out and outdated ones, in concordance with the attributions, tasks, and the missions of that institution.

During the meeting they also examined the stage reached in the implementation of the decision of the 14 December 1993 meeting of the Supreme Defense Council, regarding the restructuring of the defense industry. They emphasized that upon the recommendation of the council, the Romanian Government, by Decision 75 of 28 February 1994, set up the Government Commission for the Restructuring of the Defense Industry, which until now has established the principles of the restructuring and has elaborated the draft law on the protection of the patrimony and personnel of the defense industry, which is to be forwarded to the Romanian Parliament. The main objectives of the draft bill is the ensuring of the integrity of the necessary patrimony in the defense industry and the social protection of the specialized personnel working in it. They decided that at the next meeting of the Supreme Defense Council the Government Commission should present for approval

the final program of the restructuring of the defense industry, which should also take into consideration the agreements reached on 27 June 1994 by representatives of the government and the leaders of the trade unions in the defense industry.

The council emphasized that the restructuring of the defense industry should also result in the setting up of certain functional structures able to ensure the unitary coordination of research, the assimilation of products, and the delivery of weaponry and military equipment products, taking into consideration the needs of the national defense system, as well as the specific circumstances of the process of Romania's integration within European and Euro-Atlantic bodies.

They approved the proposals made by the national Defense Ministry on the development and modernizing of the system of informing and warning the population, as well as of the shelters for the protection of the civilian population when required.

The Supreme Defense Council examined the stage reached in the elaboration of the individual program of partnership between Romania and NATO for the year 1994, pointing out that on 7 and 8 July, at NATO headquarters, a Romanian delegation negotiated the final form of the document. The individual partnership program is based on NATO documents establishing the unitary conception, the objectives, and the forms of the Partnership for Peace, as well as on the presentation document handed in by Romania on 28 April 1994. The individual partnership program, in its final form, is to be submitted for sanctioning to the Supreme Defense Council and the NATO Permanent Council. Each year, on the basis of mutual agreement, the partnership program between Romania and NATO will be re-examined and updated.

On the basis of a briefing presented by the state minister and foreign affairs minister [Teodor Melescanu], the council approved the proposals on Romania's participation in peacekeeping missions within the framework of international bodies—the United Nations, the NATO, the CSCE, and the West European Union. The council reasserted Romania's readiness to participate with military troops both in peace-keeping missions—observing the principle of non-participation on the territory of neighboring countries—and in other international humanitarian actions to eliminate the consequences of natural catastrophes.

Taking note of the current situation and agreeing with the measures taken regarding the research and production of certain toxic combat substances, as presented by the national defense minister [Gheorghe Tinca], the Supreme Defense Council reasserted the declaration that the Romanian state does not possess, does not produce, and will not acquire, in any way, nuclear, chemical, or bacteriological weapons and cooperates on international plane for the non-proliferation of such mass destruction weapons and of their delivery systems.

In the conclusion of the meeting the council examined other current issues in concordance with its competence as stipulated by law, says a communique sent to us via fax from Romania's presidency.

Production of Domestic Laser Sights To Be Launched Soon

AU1407201994 Belgrade VECERNJE NOVOSTI in Serbo-Croatian 13 Jul 94 p 10

[Unattributed report: "Domestic Laser Sight—Soon"]

[Text] The MTT—Physics Institute from Belgrade should soon launch the production of a laser sight for the

domestic munitions industry, says electronics engineer and inventor Janez Golobic.

The domestic manufacture of laser sights will be based on Golobic's thesis "The Technology of Manufacture and Characterization of Polycarbonate Lenses"], recently presented at the Electronics Faculty in Belgrade.

Laser sights on small arms are a reliable aid to special military and police units in avoiding civilian casualties during anti-terrorist operations and in city riots.

Their use is limited and it is easier to obtain a license for arms than for the purchase of laser sights, claims Golobic.

BRAZIL

IAEA Team Visits Brazil

Inspects Navy Nuclear Center in Ipero

PY0807020794 Sao Paulo AGENCIA ESTADO
in Portuguese 1256 GMT 7 Jul 94

[Article by Jose Maria Tomazela]

[Text] Sorocaba, 7 Jul (AE)—A technical team from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which is headquartered in Vienna, Austria, has for the first time inspected the Aramar Research Center, a Navy facility in Ipero, 130 km from Sao Paulo. The center, where the Navy enriches uranium and is developing a nuclear submarine, was initially dedicated in 1988, and had been one of the best kept Brazilian military secrets.

The inspection, which began last week, lasted five days and was officially concluded yesterday, 6 July. The inspection team was accompanied by technicians from the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC). ABACC has regularly inspected the center since 1992, when the Brazilian Government signed a bilateral agreement with Argentina. The IAEA has more than 100 member countries, some of which have already mastered nuclear technology. During the inspection, physicists observed the incoming and outgoing material that is processed in the enrichment units, going from the raw material, uranium hexafluoride, to enriched uranium pills.

According to ABACC Assistant Secretary Carlos Feu Alvim, there were no problems during the inspection, but the IAEA did not report the results. "The information that was gathered is being analyzed, but everything seems to indicate that the parameters that have been declared are being complied with," he said, adding that if there are irregularities the agency will demand measures from the Brazilian Government.

Alvim said that at this inspection, IAEA technicians were mostly interested in preventing any diversion of nuclear materials between the arrival of the material and its departure from the facilities. "In this regard, control measures are quite rigid, because quantities are checked at all processing stages," he said. Materials are controlled through closed computer systems, without any chance for changing recorded information.

The team also carefully searched for possible clandestine facilities or deposits. Technicians were also concerned about the degree of uranium enrichment. The facilities have been licensed for producing 20 percent enriched uranium. This is an appropriate concentration for, for example, moving the reactors that will equip the nuclear submarine. At higher concentrations, the material could be used for producing nuclear devices. "Aramar is apparently operating within normal parameters," he said.

ABACC inspects the Ipero Navy nuclear center once a month. Alvim said IAEA inspections, though less frequent, will also become a routine, "but the dates for inspections are not made public." According to him, the quadripartite agreement signed on 4 March 1994 by Brazil, the IAEA, Argentina, and ABACC establishes that the government should be advised of inspections one week in advance. The agreement preserves industrial secrets, closing access to the technologies that are used, for example, for the production of uranium enrichment ultracentrifuges. Aramar is already producing carbon alloy ultracentrifuges, which are the most sophisticated of its type.

To Inspect Angra-1 Nuclear Plant

PY0907023394 Sao Paulo AGENCIA ESTADO
in Portuguese 2250 GMT 7 Jul 94

[Text] Sorocaba, Sao Paulo, 7 Jul (AE)—The Angra-1 nuclear plant will be the next target of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) team that concluded its first inspection of the Navy Aramar Research Center in Ipero, Sao Paulo this week. By the end of the year, all the nuclear installations in Brazil that work with purified radioactive material like enriched uranium will have been inspected. An IAEA team for the first time inspected the zero power reactor installed in the Coordinating Center for Special Projects (Copesp) in Sao Paulo.

According to physicist Carlos Feu Alvim, assistant secretary of the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control (ABACC), the Brazilian nuclear program was opened to inspection by the IAEA through a four-party agreement signed among Brazil, the IAEA, Argentina, and the ABACC. The agreement has been in force since 4 March and it allows the IAEA, which is made up of more than 100 countries, to control the flow of radioactive material in nuclear installations. The objective is to prevent this material from being used to manufacture atomic weapons, Alvim said. "The installations that operate with radioactive elements are targets of inspection," he added.

This includes the research reactors installed in the Institute for Nuclear and Energy Research, IPEN, in the Sao Paulo University Campus; in the Nuclear Technological Development Center [Centro de Desenvolvimento Tecnológico Nuclear—CTDN] in Rio de Janeiro; in the Nuclear Energy Institute [Instituto de Energia Nuclear—IEN] in Belo Horizonte; in the plant for conversion of uranium into uranium hexafluoride in the Copesp; and in the fuel element (uranium tablets) factory in Resende, Rio de Janeiro. The 11 megawatt reactor that is being built in Ipero will be added to the list in 1995.

According to Alvim, samples of uranium processed in Aramar were taken to Vienna where they will be analyzed in IAEA laboratories. "The tests will confirm whether the enriched uranium concentration match with that declared." The Aramar plant is licensed to enrich uranium by 20 percent, which is the concentration

necessary to use as nuclear fuel, but not enough to build an atomic bomb. Alvim said that "if any difference of enrichment rate is detected between that declared by Aramar and that found in the tests, it will be viewed as an irregularity." In such a case, the Brazilian Government would be notified, he added.

Alvim believes that by signing the treaty with the IAEA, Brazil has confirmed it will not build nuclear weapons. "The government would not open its installations if it intended to disrespect the treaty," he said. Countries like Israel, India, and Pakistan, which want to build an atomic bomb, have not signed an agreement with the IAEA.

IAEA Verifies 10 Percent Uranium Enrichment in Ipero

PY1307164394 *Sao Paulo GAZETA MERCANTIL*
in Portuguese 12 Jul 94 p 5

[Article by Cesar Felicio in Brasilia]

[Text] The Navy Ministry yesterday confirmed that the recent inspection of the uranium enrichment installations in Ipero by experts from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was carried out in accordance with the dispositions of the Tlatelolco Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. According to Navy Ministry sources, the IAEA experts were able to verify that the isotopic enrichment of uranium carried out in Ipero is 10 percent, a figure nine times below what would be necessary to develop nuclear weapons.

The uranium enrichment process being developed by the Navy in Ipero is designed for the construction of a propulsion system for nuclear submarines.

Analyst Criticizes Missile Technology Control Regime

PY0107143694 *Sao Paulo O ESTADO DE S. PAULO*
in Portuguese 30 Jun 94 p B2

[Commentary by Jose Montserrat Filho: "Reliable Brazil"]

[Text] Brazil has become a reliable country from a nuclear viewpoint, has banned all nuclear weapon projects, and has signed unequivocal international agreements to use nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes. This was established by the Constitution that was approved in 1988, yet it did not neutralize U.S. distrust. Things are different today.

Last February, we ratified the quadripartite agreement involving Brazil, Argentina, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control (ABACC), and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which will inspect nuclear facilities and materials in both countries. Last 30 May we signed the Tlatelolco Treaty banning

nuclear weapons from Brazilian territory. Congress should soon approve a project establishing strict control on the exportation of sensitive materials and technology for double use (civil and military), preventing any transfer to other countries. Furthermore, the Brazilian Space Agency (AEB) was created last 9 February. This civil agency, which is directly subordinated to the president, guaranteeing that our space projects are exclusively peaceful.

In 1988, the United States did not trust Brazil and enforced the MTCR [Missile Technology Control Regime] to stop the construction of Brazil's Satellite Launch Vehicle (VLS). They were suspicious it might be used to launch nuclear weapons. The MTCR was created in 1987 by the more industrialized countries of the West (G-7)—headed by the United States—with the proclaimed objective of preventing the proliferation of missiles capable of carrying a payload of more than 500 kg over a distance of 300 km or more. This technology is double-edged: It can be used to launch a space rocket or to carry a warhead.

At that time, Brazil offered the United States guarantees that the VLS would be used for peaceful purposes only. U.S. technicians were offered the possibility to inspect all phases—until its recovery at sea—of the use of the technology that they might have sold us. The offer was not taken up. They considered Brazil unreliable because it did not assume any international commitment banning nuclear weapons.

The objective of the MTCR is obviously commendable. Yet how can we overlook the fact that the MTCR is an informal agreement, it is not based on either a treaty or a convention, it has no specific legal structure, it has no clearly defined rights and duties, it has no publicly known rules for making or implementing decisions, its operations are not clear, and there is no way to internationally appeal its decisions? How can we forget that some countries in this exclusive club have appointed themselves judges and administrators of justice, making and implementing unilateral decisions in matters that concern the entire international community? How can we tolerate a regime that harms the principle of equality among nations—which is the foundation of the international legal order, as established in the United Nations charter that sets the rules for a more democratic and fairer world?

If Brazil was not a reliable country, the MTCR has never been a legal, legitimate solution to prevent the proliferation of missiles. Brazil has changed, but the MTCR has not. It remains an arbitrary, discriminatory instrument, and a bad example for the progressive development of international law.

If we are now reliable, why should we join an anti-democratic system that is unreliable? To obtain access to sophisticated technology? Who says this technology will come with a pragmatic, opportunistic attitude like that? Is our tradition of ethical and legal behavior in international relations not worth anything now?

Lula Visits Bonn, Promises Not To Finish Nuclear Plant

PY2506030094 Sao Paulo AGENCIA ESTADO in Portuguese 2102 GMT 24 Jun 94

[Report By Reali Junior]

[Text] Paris, 24 Jun (AE)—If it were up to Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, the Angra-2 nuclear plant would not be built. The PT [Workers Party] presidential candidate made this commitment during talks he held today in Bonn with representatives of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation. During a recent visit to Bonn, Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim had assured German Government officials interested in the progress of that plant that it would be built.

Yet Lula and Marco Aurelio Garcia, the external area coordinator of the PT program, did not succeed in convincing German businessmen. They were both evasive regarding foreign trade financing and the PT approach to the foreign debt. The representative of the Deutsch Sud Amerikan Bank walked out of the room in protest over Lula's confusing positions about the Brazilian reality.

In a meeting with German Vice Foreign Minister Helmut Schafer, Lula stated that a PT government would honor all of the agreements signed by Brazil regarding nuclear nonproliferation and the missile control regime.

CHILE

Government Rejects PRC Nuclear Test, DPRK Nuclear Position

PY2506033494 Santiago EL MERCURIO in Spanish 15 Jun 94 p C2

[Text] The government yesterday rejected the PRC decision to conduct a new nuclear bomb test, and also the DPRK's reluctance to allow inspection of its nuclear installations by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

The PRC decision has led the Chilean Government to summon the PRC diplomatic representative today. Special Policy Director Pablo Cabrera will express to him the government's concern.

Concerning the North Korean position, it was reported that Chile cosponsored the IAEA resolution that imposes drastic sanctions, including the withdrawal of assistance to programs for the peaceful use of nuclear energy, except for aspects related to medicine.

The IAEA was assisting North Korea with \$240 million for such programs.

The Chilean Government reaction to these two situations is in line with its traditional position and with instructions from President Eduardo Frei on the matter.

A clear step was taken in this regard on 18 January of this year when Chile, a signatory of the treaty proscribing nuclear weapons in Latin America, became an active member of the Tlatelolco Treaty, in order to begin immediate negotiations with the IAEA seeking agreement on safeguards through which all its activities in the nuclear field would be subjected to control by the IAEA.

The government has been following attentively what has been happening in North Korea. In addition to the North Korean position, which is repudiated by Chile, is the fact that this is a Pacific Rim country with which excellent political and economic relations have been maintained.

Due to international pressure the DPRK Government had recently announced its immediate withdrawal from the IAEA, thus making even more remote any international control of its nuclear activities.

The North Korean reluctance to allow international inspections has been one of the factors, not to say the main one, preventing a stronger bilateral relationship.

The tension generated by the sanctions imposed by the IAEA, and the statements made by the United States, Japan, and South Korea, have prompted fear that the confrontation could become aggravated or even lead to war.

It is a dangerous situation, but "the real interpretation" made by the Chilean Foreign Ministry is that it is not as dramatic, as it considers the tough North Korean position to be a subterfuge aimed at obtaining a greater advantage in negotiations.

Special Policy Director Pablo Cabrera will convey today to the PRC diplomatic representative the Chilean Government's concern over the PRC decision to test a new nuclear weapon in the Lop Nor testing ground, in the western province of Xinjiang.

In a public statement lamenting the PRC decision, the government states that this explosion can be added to another explosion conducted by the same country last year.

"The Chilean Government hopes, once again, that these nuclear tests will end definitively, seeking to achieve the total proscription of nuclear weapons for the benefit of international peace and security, a hope much desired by mankind now that we are on the doorstep of the third millennium," the note ends.

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Palestinian Denies Involvement in Secret Arms Sale to Iraq

NC0907100294 Nicosia CYPRUS MAIL in English
9 Jul 94 p 20

[Report by Jean Christou]

[Text] A Cyprus-based Palestinian businessman last night refused to comment on reports that he is suing South African arms giant Armscor over unpaid commissions for the secret sale of weapons to Iraq during the Iraq-Iran war.

When contacted by the CYPRUS MAIL, Walid Saffuri, who lives in Limassol, denied he was an arms dealer.

Although he admitted filing a suit against a South African company, Saffuri refused to comment further except to say that he has all the evidence to prove his case.

REUTERS yesterday reported Saffuri as saying: "I'm suing Armscor, owned by the government of South Africa, for conspiracy and fraud and in Guernsey I'm suing another arms company for breach of contract".

REUTERS said Saffuri calls himself a "technology-promoter" and has documents to prove he is owed \$495 million in unpaid commission for secret deals with the Iraqis during the war, which ended in 1989.

According to the report, an Armscor spokesman in Johannesburg said the company was being sued by Saffuri but refused to comment on the amount involved.

Saffuri told REUTERS he expected a trial to take place sometime in 1995 in both South Africa and island of Guernsey, where one of his offshore companies is registered.

Saffuri, who set up an offshore transport company in Limassol in 1984, told REUTERS the Iraqi deals were done through a Guernsey-registered company he owns.

He also said Silver Falcon Holdings, his company in Cyprus, has absolutely nothing to do with the matter.

EGYPT

U.S. 'Double Standards' on Nuclear Weapons Criticized

NC0107195194 Cairo AL-AHRAM
in Arabic 25 Jun 94 p 9

[Article by Zakariya Nil: "The World Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and the Future of the Israeli Arsenal"]

[Excerpts] Isn't it high time that the United States realizes that the policy of double standards it applies in many of its positions can no longer be accepted from a

superpower that is leading a uni-polar world singlehandedly? Doesn't it know that the changes in the world, with their sharp turns, dictate that it give up its bias in favor of Israel to regain the trust it is missing precisely because of such unethical stands? Does the U.S. Administration have the moral courage to treat Israel the way it does North Korea as far as non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is concerned?

It is not in defense of North Korea to say that after the crisis between U.S. President Bill Clinton and Korean President Kim Il-song reached its climax, North Korea agreed to freeze the implementation of its nuclear program and to permit the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] to continue its inspection of its nuclear facilities. Regardless of how we may judge the stand of either party, the question here is: Would the U.S. Administration pursue the same approach it followed in Korea's case with Israel to reveal its nuclear program and reverse its refusal to let international observers, even if they are American, inspect its nuclear reactors? [passage omitted]

It is now clear that the future of the Middle East will be determined by the outcome of the ongoing talks between Israel and the Arab parties to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict. Included in these talks are the multilateral talks on arms control, economic relations, the environment, and water. Such a settlement could lead to a just and comprehensive peace. But since the Arab people look for a just and lasting peace that recognizes the people's inalienable rights, the main obstacle to such a peace is the absence of equal security among the region's countries. This is manifest at the military level by Israel's attempts to preserve and develop its nuclear weapons arsenal so that the forthcoming agreements can be concluded under the shadow of this arsenal, which threatens the very existence of the Arab nation and all the Arab peoples. [passage omitted]

But the question is: Who can change the U.S. policy of double standards so that it can stop protecting Israel's rebellion at the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, its refusal to join it and, consequently, rejection of an international inspection of its nuclear facilities? Israel now has four nuclear reactors and is in the process of building a fifth one. It will be not more than 25 km from the Egyptian area of al-'Awjah; to be more precise, it will be located in (Shivta), in the Negev Desert, which is a violation of IAEA rules that stipulate that nuclear installations must be built at least 50 km from borders with other countries. The power of the new reactor, which an agreement has been concluded to import from Russia, will be 450 megawatts. The Israeli Government has assigned one of its nuclear energy experts, Amnon Inah [name as transliterated], to supervise the implementation of this project.

The strange thing is that the Western quarters, including the United States, know that the Middle East region, including Israel, could face total destruction should any

miscalculation in the Israeli nuclear arsenal occur. However, they remain silent over threats that could destroy all their interests in a region that constitutes a vast market for their products. Not a voice was raised to ask: Why was North Korea warned to suspend its nuclear program and Israel was not? Is it because some Western nations, such as France, the United States, Germany, and Britain have contributed to building the Israeli nuclear reactors? Nevertheless, these same people who have contributed financial aid, expertise, and equipment to building these reactors are banned from visiting and inspecting them, and the ban applies to America itself!

Israel has four nuclear reactors. One of them, "Robin," is used in producing radioactive isotopes. With its possession of 200 nuclear bombs, as has been confirmed, Israel has joined the club of nations possessing nuclear weapons. So how can the ban on nuclear weapons apply to all small countries, which are punished if they do not suspend their nuclear programs or comply with international inspection, and the same ban would not dare come close to Israel? It is no longer a political issue, but a matter of survival of humanity. Thus, a world campaign for the nonproliferation of mass destruction weapons serves human and not political, ethnic, or regional goals. It is an issue that concerns all people living in this world, which is becoming more troubled the closer we come to the 21st century.

INDIA

Experts Say Complete Missile System Needed

94WP0109A Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA
in English 31 May 94 p 4

[Text] New Delhi, May 30 (PTI [Press Trust of India]).

India must have a complete missile system if only for its deterrence value, external pressures to give it up notwithstanding, say defence experts.

"India must develop a complete missile system to deter any neighbouring countries who are pursuing aggressive missile programmes from launching missile attacks on India", says Maj. Gen. D. Bannerjee, deputy director of the Institute of Defence Study and Analysis (IDSA), here.

India is surrounded by one time foe China and its arch enemy Pakistan—both missile powers.

"I don't believe in destruction of cities with missiles, but if the enemy knows that you have your own missile they will think twice before firing one at you," he said.

While India has both offensive and defensive missile capabilities, it has yet to deploy the two medium range missiles Prithvi and Agni. Prithvi has attained operational status, while Agni is still in developmental stage.

"Agni is just a technology demonstration and the government has not even decided if it will produce Agni for the armed forces," he said.

The defensive missiles in India's arsenal are Akash and Trishul, both capable of intercepting aircraft and missiles. Both are now in services.

India, which unveiled its first Short Range Ballistic Missile (SRBM) "Prithvi" meaning earth, on January 26, 1994, is in the process of developing an Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) "Agni" (fire).

While Prithvi has a range of 250 km and a pay load of 500 kg highly explosive, the two-stage Agni with inertial and terminal guidance is capable of delivering 1000 kg of single conventional explosive, submunition or chemical warhead upto 2500 km.

Agni is believed to use a motor similar to the first stage solid rocket motor from Indian Satellite Launch Vehicle (SLV 3) which has been used in various satellites since 1979. The second stage of Agni uses a shortened Prithvi missile liquid propellant motor system.

Agni has a special shell to protect the warhead from being burnt out during reentry into the atmosphere. Reports have indicated that the technology could have been transferred from Germany but both parties have denied such a transfer and India asserts that the technology was entirely indigenous.

The first successful test launch of Agni was made in 1989 when a trial missile flew about 1000 km. A second test flight was made in 1992 and this failed reportedly due to a fault in the second stage.

The launch of Agni generated strong emotions in the West with the U.S. seeing it as development of more weapons and delivery system of mass destruction in the third world, says *The Asian Strategic Review* in its ballistic missile proliferation.

However, India has denied that it plans to tip the missile with nuclear warheads leaving experts to assume that conventional explosives, chemical or submunition warheads will be developed with an accurate terminal guidance system.

Another option, *Jane's Defence Weekly* reports, would be to develop a fuel-air explosive (FAE) warhead, that would require less accurate delivery.

The weekly also suggests that India is considering the design of an intercontinental range ballistic missile building on the experience and using the developed Augmented Satellite Launch Vehicle (ASLV) as its basis.

It said in an unconfirmed report that there are possibly two Prithvi versions, an SS-150 with a range of 150 km and an SS-250 with a range of 250 km.

Both Prithvi and Agni were developed by defence research and development laboratory in Hyderabad.

Meanwhile, China, the second greatest missile power in Asia after Russia, has a stockpile of around 175 strategic land based missile and around 38 submarine based ones while Pakistan has three missiles Hatf-1, Hatf-11 and M-11 in service capable of delivering warheads to major targets in India, *Asian Strategic Review* says.

'Akash,' 'Trishul' To Unfurl Missile Umbrella

94WP0108A Hyderabad DECCAN CHRONICLE
in English 8 Jun 94 p 9

[Article by Pravin Sawhney]

[Text] New Delhi: The induction of surface-to-air missiles Akash and Trishul, which are under development, into the Indian military replacing existing systems, will end a weakness in India's military cover: air defence.

Pakistan has always given priority to its air defence (AD) system, as its geography does not give it the advantage of depth enjoyed by India. Therefore, Pakistan and India have had a different approach in the organisation and deployment of air defence weapons.

It was only on January 14, 1994 that India raised its separate corps of Air Defence artillery which the Pakistan army had done in the mid-seventies. Thereafter it raised its status to an air defence command and subordinated it to the overall command and control of the Pakistan Air Force. This degree of coordination has yet to occur in India.

Pakistan army corps facing India have been provided with 'Gun-Missile' AD regiments. These comprise twin cannon as well as missile launchers with centralised radar surveillance and tracking. A sub-unit comprises of one missile launcher and two twin cannon linked to one fire control radar. These regiments provide area cover over a holding corps zone. India does not have an equivalent.

Pakistan's forward area AD comprises of a mix of two man-made portable AD missiles (Stinger, RBS-70, Anza, PI-5 and now the French Mistral). All these detachments deployed on the forward obstacle or even beyond it in strong points for closer to the border, have been provided communications to the nearest short range fire control radar. A fairly dense and interlocked AD screen is therefore provided right up front.

That is not all Pakistani infantry and artillery units have been provided with a generous holding of dual purpose medium and heavy machine guns for ground use as well as for AD protection.

Therefore the picture that emerges is that:

The Pakistan army has given far greater weightage to forward area air defence than India.

Immediately to the rear of the combat zone, the Indian army-India Air Force AD cover becomes thicker and more lethal than that of Pakistan. There is spot deployment of shoulder-fired missiles only in the case of India.

Integral AD is entirely missing with India's mountain formations. It is only in Siachen that India have deployed light AD and shoulder fired short range AD missiles.

The current status of the respective Air Defence Ground environment (Surveillance radars, command, control, coordination) is at about the same level maybe with a slight edge in Pak. The Pakistan Air Force deploys better electronic warfare pods and has a greater degree of redundancy built in.

When Trishul, a short range (maximum 9 km) surface-to-air (SAM) missile was conceived, no equivalent SAM was in service in the Indian army or the air force. General characteristics laid down in the qualitative requirement put it in the ROLAND (French) and its clone the OSA-AK (SAM-8 of the USSR) class.

Thereafter the OSA-AK, AKM came into limited service with both the Indian army and the air force. For the former, it was purchased to thicken the short range AD cover for its mobile reserves. The IAF [Indian Air Force] purchased the system for air base defence in areas where the Pichora SAM-3 would be masked and ineffective—say the Srinagar-Avantipur airfields.

Trishul, a fully mobile system mounted on a tracked BMP chassis, will replace the OSA-AK and thereafter augment the numbers deployed at present, on a one-to-one basis.

Trishul, like the SAM-8 is a fully autonomous system in that a surveillance and tracking radar, a fire control radar and a bank of six missiles are integrated and mounted on the same chassis. It may be classified as a point defence system accompanying mechanised columns.

Basic performance closely resembles ROLAND and OSA-AK but with a greater slant range. The greatest advantage (as with Akash), is that its electronics are uncompromised whereas the former have been completely analyzed by the West and passed on to Pakistan (Iraq used both in the Gulf War).

Trishul comes in two models—a standard Land AD system against low level air threats, and a 'naval' version, where a modified platform will use a tracking radar optimised against sea clutter (the radar is now being tried out on a test bed deployed in a coastal area), and the missile will be fitted with a radio altimeter to keep the flight path 7m above the water level.

This version will be used against incoming anti-shipping missiles of the Exocet/Harpoon class (deployed by Pakistan). This will be the first missile based 'close in weapon system' (CIWS) for Indian Navy ships.

The missile has been given high agility—the rate of turn being 90 degrees per second and an adequate range of 9 km with a 5.5 kg prefragmented high explosive warhead fitted with a proximity fuse.

The missile is guided all the way by the fire control radar, which has been provided with state-of-the-art clutter suppression and discrimination. It is opined that the radar would be able to pick up a target with a cross-section and small as F7-P (MIG 21) when viewed head on, at maximum range. Reaction time to launch will be faster than ROLAND or SAM-8. (It has to be, otherwise it will fail in the CIWS role).

Outwardly the missile itself looks exactly like the Kvadrat (SAM-6) in service with the army for more than a decade.

Akash is a radar guided missile with terminal homing, again by a radar fitted in its nose cone. General characteristics in propulsion and weight, etc. have been exactly reverse engineered from the SAM-6. Maximum slant range is 25 km and the height of engagement is 12,000 metres.

The system is fully mobile and a sub unit comprises of: One BMP tracked vehicle with a bank of three missiles.

The "Rajendra" phased array radar system (Tracking, guidance and identification Friend or Foe on the one antenna plate) with computerised controls. Maximum surveillance and tracking range is given out as 60 km with the ability to track 9 targets simultaneously. This is a huge improvement on the SAM-6 electronics.

A third BMP chassis houses the fire control cabin and crew. It has mast mounted directional antennae for communications with a long range surveillance radar of the Indra-I and Indra-II types along with voice/data channels. One missile group (for the army) will comprise of four sub units described above, with a support battery providing missile reloads and maintenance/rear communication facilities.

One missile group will give an area coverage of roughly 60 km into 60 km when deployed in a square fashion with adequate overlap. This will (for instance) suffice to cover the concentration area of a whole strike corps. Thereafter, missile sub units would move in a co-ordinated manner with mechanised columns.

For the Indian air force, it will replace the Pichora (SAM-3) for base air defence as well as other vital areas.

The specific advantages of the Akash system will be:

Much faster reaction time compared to the SAM-6 system (both are capable of engaging Mach-3 speed targets).

It is Indigenous. Therefore, there would be very little, if any important problems.

Mass manufacture should cut down costs (but this is debatable in rupee terms).

Uncompromised electronics. Further the "Rajendra" and associated computerised displays/digital information passages have been given very high electronic counter-measure capability.

If the Akash comes through with all its design characteristics intact, it will pose a major threat to the Pakistan Air Force.

What we are looking at in the future are:

Thicker missile AD cover provided in two overlapping tiers, the inner by Trishul and the outer by Akash.

Full electronic coordination between the two systems is possible, giving an operational commander a wide range of choice in prioritisation of deployment.

Many Indian naval ships at present equipped with dated and fairly useless SAMs will at last get the AD protection they deserve.

From the Asian Age

Commentary Approves of Keeping Nuclear Option Open

BK0107111294 Delhi INDIA TODAY
in English 30 Jun 94 p 5

[Unattributed commentary]

[Text] Hawkish statements by politicians make for good election planks but rarely good diplomacy. Last fortnight, when the BJP demanded at its meeting in Vadodara that India should produce nuclear weapons, it brought a quick reprimand from Prime Minister Narasimha Rao. At a time when India is under severe pressure to sign the NPT [Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty], the stance of the nation's largest opposition party couldn't have provided more ammunition for the US to argue that there is no guarantee of a continuity in India's stated policy of peaceful nuclear purposes.

By announcing that his Government was keeping open the nuclear option, Rao reiterated a policy grounded in lessons learnt from history. Between 1971, when it last fought a full-fledged war, and 1994, India has been continuously engaged in mending fences with its neighbours. But the past hostilities cannot be wished away. By adding that India shall not go in for actual bomb-making, Rao made it clear that the country does not intend to rattle sabres in a region that is not exactly a paragon of amity.

The policy, however, will continue to invite US pressure to sign the NPT. But instead of pussyfooting or harbouring a sense of guilt, India needs to convey to the US clearly that the issue concerns an entire nation's security. In doing so, India's arguments cannot be more well-grounded: it has for neighbours China, which has been thumbing its nose at the U.S. for years by detonating nuclear devices with impunity; and Pakistan, whose

weaponry, including the F-16s, continues to be refurbished with unfailing regularity by the US, and which, by many accounts, already possesses a nuclear device. For the US to tell India to sign the NPT while admitting that its influence on China's nuclear stance is limited is an exercise in absurdity the U.S. administration should be persuaded to abandon.

Equally, India needs to stick to the terms it has been insisting on all through. Such as a universal and nondiscriminatory arrangement, instead of the NPT, to tackle nuclear non-proliferation: and non-interference with India's civilian nuclear programme. With its known nuclear capability, India can bargain from a position of strength. And having observed the longest moratorium on a nuclear-bomb explosion, it has the moral high ground too. These are the cards India should go on playing until it gets a treaty on its own terms.

Article Criticizes U.S. Handling of NPT

BK2806100294 *Bombay NAVBHARAT TIMES*
in Hindi 21 Jun 94 p 9

[Article by Avil Kumar Sharma: "Pakistan and the F-16 Bombers"]

[Text] The recent US proposal to hand over the second lot of 38 F-16 bombers to Pakistan without Islamabad first putting a lid on her nuclear programs and accepting the international security measures adds a new chapter in U.S. policy on the nuclear non-proliferation treaty [NPT] in South Asia. Whereas the U.S. attitude towards India is manifested by a variety of pressures and proposed sanctions that are consistent, her attitude towards Pakistan is fickle and often full of contradictions. The latest U.S. enticement of Pakistan, whose nuclear weapons program was chiefly nurtured by the feigned indifference and inactivity of the U.S., is its move to suppress and cover its despair in NPT matters by pressuring her protege.

During the cold-war, the U.S. indifference to Pakistan's nuclear arms program was only a mask. This enabled arms to be supplied continually to Afghan rebels in their uprising against the USSR-supported government of Najibollah. This was also the reason why despite the controversial information received through CIA sources, the U.S. President continued to issue 'clean-chits' on Pakistan's nuclear program.

But the end of the cold-war signified a decline in the importance of Pakistan for the U.S. The result being that the White House at the end of October 1990, expressed its inability to issue such chits. Consequently, all the military aid given to Pakistan under the Pressler Amendment provisions were stopped. But contrary to even U.S. expectations, Pakistan managed to meet all its defense needs in the last four years.

It appears that Pakistan is not likely to be trapped by this U.S. enticement as she has her own problems. Even if Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto wants to, she cannot

accept the U.S. proposal as Pakistan's nuclear program is in the hands of the military, with opposition leader Nawaz Sharif giving it a political color. Prime Minister Bhutto perhaps would not like to shatter the dreams of her father Zulfikar Ali Bhutto who launched the nuclear program under any external pressure by suspending it.

According to a report published in Washington, the U.S. would like to entice India together with Pakistan, to nab the former in her policy trap. If India agrees to sign the nuclear NPT and accepts the measures for international security proposed by the U.S., the latter might extend her the following benefits.

- (1) First, the U.S. could take the initiative by resuming to supply fuel for the Tarapur Power Plant. It may be recalled that after India's peaceful nuclear testing in Pokharan in 1974, the U.S. stopped supplying fuel for the plant in 1980-81 under its policy of coercion and regulation of nuclear nonproliferation. But, due to the (?determined) policy of Indira Gandhi and her followers, and France as its alternative supplier of Uranium U-235, India not only successfully ran the plant, it also did not compromise on its nuclear policy.
- (2) Also, an assurance could be given to soft peddle Super 301 measures. The U.S. has all along been threatening India together with Japan and Brazil with imposing economic and trade sanctions for their prohibitive business behavior under Super 301 rules. Any U.S. decision in this regard would prove extremely important for India in her current weakened economy because one-fifth of its total exports are consumed in the U.S.
- (3) With the liberalization of U.S. rules on computer imports, it may become possible for India to start exporting her latest computers. After a recent liberalization, the U.S. Department of Commerce allowed India to export computers of the level of 500 MTO-PAS. If the U.S. wants, it can raise this level to 1000 MTOPAS, the limit it prescribes for other countries. India's present quota is only 125 MTOPAS.
- (4) Another concession is providing complete help to Hindustan Aeronautics in manufacturing light bombers. The cessation of aid from the U.S. firm. Marin Marietta, to Indian scientists in design-development for advanced flight-control systems could prove to be a great headache. But any ban on General Electric engines by the U.S. could ground the whole program till the Kaveri engine, which is still being produced by the Gas Turbine Research Organization, is ready.

How far would these U.S. enticements to India like the F-16 bombers to Pakistan, serve U.S. economic interests? The basic idea of resuming the supply of uranium and helping in the manufacture of light bombers is to make India dependent on the U.S. On the other hand, the supplies of the most modern computers is also

guided by demand. Computer technology is a monopoly of the U.S. and Japan. The aim of the relaxation of the U.S.-Japan computer monopoly is to remove hurdles in its competition with Japan, which as a result the U.S. electronics industry has so far suffered losses of \$30 billion. India's increased use of computers and the huge size of its market could help compensate the U.S. favorably for this loss.

Like India and Pakistan, another victim of the economic-interest-spurred by U.S. NPT policy is North Korea. By blowing out of proportion North Korea's nuclear capability, the U.S., on one hand, has been able to make its active role in nuclear nonproliferation felt. On the other hand, by creating an atmosphere of fear in South Korea, it has activated a market for its weapons new and old. The recent supply of Patriot missiles bear testimony to this assertion. Unhappy with the U.S. decision to resume supplying F-16 bombers to Pakistan, the Republican Senator from South Dakota and the author of the Pressler Law, Gary Pressler, has perhaps rightly commented: "Instead of adopting a responsible policy on NPT in South Asia, the Clinton administration appears to be conducting only the sale of the military arms and junk brought out from the Pentagon garage." Whether it is to restore the F-16 jets to Pakistan at the cost of Pakistan's nuclear program or frightening the South Koreans by magnifying the nuclear capability of North Korea and thus ensuring the sale of her missiles to South Korea, the only aim of U.S. policy is to use the NPT to enhance regional imbalances, and as a cover to fan the demand for traditional arms that has been dying after the end of the cold war. To the U.S. this appears to be the only way to save its arms industry, which has now fallen on bad times. To achieve this, the U.S. can go to the extent of using the nuclear nonproliferation as a weapon and it into cold storage in case it fails.

The Clinton Administration has not made a final decision on Pakistan's F-16 jets. However, the views of the Assistant State Secretary Robin Raphel in the context of the ineffectiveness of the Pressler Amendment for achieving the NPT aims indicate that the U.S. might restore its supply without any conditions, and this should cause no surprise.

If the U.S. is really worried about the increasing number of countries with nuclear capability, why does it not forgo its business ruses and attempt to set a treaty that is acceptable to all? Such a treaty should not only provide guarantees for nonnuclear countries by prohibiting the use of force by nuclear states, it should also provide for an early and systematic destruction of their nuclear arsenals.

Papers Report Success, Significance of Prithvi

Details of Missile, Launching

94WP0107A Hyderabad DECCAN CHRONICLE
in English 5 Jun 94 p 1

[Text] Balasore, June 4 (UNI [United News of India]): The surface-to-surface missile Prithvi was successfully launched in the final Army user trials from the Interim Test Range (ITR) at Chandipur-on-sea near here on Saturday.

The indigenously-built medium-range missile soared into the clear blue skies at 11.44 am, hitting the built-up target in the Tentulichuda island off the Bhadrak coast in the Bay of Bengal.

The 150 to 250 km range missile, designed for quick manoeuvrability and wartime efficiency, will be inducted into the Army next month if the second trial on Monday is successful.

Prithvi was launched from a mobile launcher on an eight-wheel truck in the presence of senior artillery officers of the Indian Army. Saturday's launch is the 13th in the series. The first test flight of Prithvi was successfully conducted on February 25, 1988.

A Defence Ministry announcement in New Delhi said the first launch in the users' test "fully met the mission requirements." The missile's target in the second users' trial will be in the high seas.

A unique feature of Saturday's launch was that Prithvi was fired by the actual users—artillery officers of the Army—instead of DRDO [Defense Research Development Organization] scientists. However, a DRDO-team, led by Dr. A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, scientific advisor to the Defence Minister, was at hand to oversee the arrangement.

After Monday's trial, the Army would certify Prithvi's performance. Based on this, the DRDO would go in for mass production of the missile for induction into the Army.

Prithvi, which is capable of deep penetration into the enemy territory has been designed to "pack the real punch" in any future wars. It is considered by defence experts to be the real answer to any threat posed by the F-16s supplied by the US to Pakistan. The transport-mounted missile can be taken close to the forward line over any kind of terrain.

DRDO experts say that Prithvi is far more accurate than the Scud series or the USLancer. The final users' trial of missile was originally slated for May 14 and was later postponed due to the Prime Minister, Mr. P.V. Narasimha Rao's official visit to the United States.

Mr. Rao, who also holds the Defence portfolio, in a strong defence of the Indian missile programme, had assured an agitated Parliament before setting off for Washington that India will not be cowed down by any one to cap its missile programme and Saturday's successful launch has established the country's determination to continue with the programme.

Prithvi can go up to a maximum of 250 km with a 500 kg warhead or 150 km with a 1,000 kg warhead. It has a minimum range of 40 km. The Army has ordered 75 of these missiles with 150 to 200 km range and the targets would mainly be troop concentrations, air bases and large static installations and headquarters.

The cluster warhead, developed for Prithvi consisting of cluster sub-munition bomblets released in airburst, would have a controlled spread and thus be able to saturate an area so that the "circular error probability" figure would be taken care of.

Second Trial Succeeds

94WP0107B Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA
in English 7 Jun 94 p 1

[Text] Chandipur-on-Sea (Orissa), June 6.

The second "user trial" of India's short-range surface-to-surface missile Prithvi was successfully conducted from within the interim test range (ITR) here today, report agencies.

The missile, which blazed into the clear sky after a perfect lift-off at 11.07 a.m., hit the target 145 km into the Bay of Bengal after travelling for four minutes and 47 seconds, official sources said.

The place where the missile hit the target was about 150 km from Puri, the sources said adding "it met the mission requirement as expected."

The Prithvi was also successfully test fired from the ITR on Saturday. It travelled a distance of just over 68 km before homing in on the target—the Wheeler's Island in the Bay of Bengal off the Orissa coast near Dhamra.

While it was fired from the Tetra Mobile Launcher near Bhimpur village on Saturday, it was launched from a helipad within the ITR this morning.

The Prithvi was tested by army men under the supervision of the scientists of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) who have developed the missile under the Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme (IGMDP).

The missile is expected to be inducted to strengthen the army's arsenal after more trials are conducted in battlefield conditions.

The later trials would be conducted in field test sites against built-up targets to test its accuracy and the lethal impact of its various conventional warheads. The Prithvi is expected to be inducted into the army by

July end but similar trials would be held later for the air force version to be used to safeguard forward air bases, the sources said.

The test-flight of the sleek missile today is the 14th in the series and the second from the Tetra Mobile Launcher manufactured by the public sector Bharat Earth Movers Limited (BEML).

There was much jubilation among army officers and DRDO scientists at the second consecutive success in firing the Prithvi missile.

Prithvi, which is capable of deep penetration into the enemy territory, has been designed to "pack the real punch" in any future wars. It is considered by defence experts to be the real answer to any threat posed by the F-16s supplied by the U.S. to Pakistan. The mobile missile can be taken close to the forward line over any kind of terrain.

Prithvi can go up to a maximum of 250 km with a 500 kg warhead or 150 km with a 1,000 kg warhead. It has a minimum range of 40 km.

Advantage to India

94WP0107C Hyderabad DECCAN CHRONICLE
in English 7 Jun 94 p 1

[Article by Pravin Sawhney: "Prithvi: Advantage India"; first paragraph is introductory paragraph]

[Text] This is the first of a series of reports detailing the growing strength of India's armed forces.

New Delhi, June 6: Deployed in sufficient numbers, the surface-to-surface Prithvi missile will tilt the Indo-Pak military balance in favour of India. Of all the missiles being indigenously developed under the Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme (IGMDP), the Prithvi is causing the deepest concern in Islamabad, with traces of worry reaching up to Washington.

Pakistan is faced with a situation where its national air defence system is suddenly completely vulnerable, for the Prithvi, unlike aircraft, cannot be challenged by anything in Pakistan's arsenal.

Pakistan is being forced to reexamine all its basic military strategies, like concentration of mass, surprise and deception. Prithvi will radically alter all subcontinental war doctrines.

The unique thing about Prithvi is that it does not replace an existing weapon system. It, therefore, retains tremendous surprise in employability. Among the other missiles being developed, the potential intermediate-range-ballistic-missile Agni is a mere technological demonstrator and not yet a missile system. The others are the surface-to-air missiles Akash and Trishul and the anti-tank Nag missile, all of which will replace existing weaponry.

It is ironical that Prithvi was accepted by the army only after the personal intervention of Rajiv Gandhi. The army had taken the position that Prithvi was better suited to another wing of the defence forces. Prithvi was conceived by the defence research and development organisation chief, Dr. A.P.J. Kalam, as an offshoot of the space programme SLV [satellite launching vehicle], with certain modifications.

Prithvi is a combination of the best and the mediocre missiles of its class in the world. At a time when most missiles of its class use solid propellants, Prithvi uses 55-55 Xylidene Triethylamine, a liquid propellant. Liquid propellants can deliver greater payloads to longer distances, but are difficult and time-consuming to handle in the field. The trade-off is a solid-fuel system's operational simplicity for the liquid-fuel system's superior performance. Like the best missiles, Prithvi has an indigenously manufactured inertial guidance system for great accuracy. The already proven accuracy of Prithvi during trials is one metre to a kilometre.

The best results in a similar class of missiles are of the Russian improved TOCHKAS, which is 15 metre circular error probaibility at 100 km. Prithvi is being developed in versions, where the range has been varied in proportion to the warhead carried by the missile. The Prithvi 150 version, meant for the army, will have a range of 150 km and a warhead of 800 to 1000 kg. This battlefield support missile is undergoing user trials and is expected to be inducted into the army by the end of the year. The air force version is the Prithvi 250, with a range of 250 km and a warhead weight of 500 kg, and is expected into the service by early 1996.

The battlefield support Prithvi will have a variety of warheads. As yet only the high explosive monolith warhead is ready and the army is expected to induct the missile based on the results of this warhead.

Once in service, Prithvi will drastically alter the war fighting doctrines against Pakistan and China. This is attributed to two peculiarities of the missile. First, anti-missile missile systems such as the Israeli Arrow and the US Patriots will be ineffective against Prithvi. Unlike a free fall ballistic arc in missiles of its class, the Prithvi trajectory rises 30 km during the initial powered phase, followed by a non-boosted cruise phase, and ending in a steep descent of nearly 80 degrees. Such a trajectory will be difficult for the enemy to get on the radar screen. Since the missile radar signature will be huge as it rises, all that the enemy will get will be its general location, and not an accurate location required for destroying the missile by counter fire.

Even this light disadvantage has been taken care of by the missile's ability to shoot and scoot.

The corresponding Pakistani Hatf-1, 1A and 2 missiles, with ranges between 80 km to 150 km, are unlikely to have the Prithvi trajectory advantage. The other disadvantage with the Pakistani missiles is that they have been transferred and assembled in limited numbers, with Chinese assistance. An indigenous Prithvi can be mass produced, in line with a subcontinental requirement where quantity prevails over quality.

Second, unlike other missiles, as the Prithvi does not replace an existing weapon system, it will retain sufficient surprise about its employability. Especially when it is fully mobile on an 8x8 Tatra vehicle.

It is this aspect of Prithvi that threatens the war fighting doctrines between Indian and Pakistan.

DOCTRINAL CHANGES: With a range of 150 km, Prithvi will enter a traditional battlefield where the artillery of both India and Pakistan, fires a maximum range of 40 km. As the war doctrines of both countries are exactly similar, the three graded levels of war, as tactical, operational and strategic will become blurred. A tactical battlefield is up to 20 km from the border, the operational depth is 50 to 60 km from the border, behind which is the strategic depth. The tactical levels are fought by a division, the operational levels by a corps and beyond that the army commander takes over control of the war in his theatre.

With ranges between 40 km and 150 km, Prithvi will upset the very chain of war command exhortated over years to the officers of the two armies at their schools of instruction. Furthermore, the peculiarity of the Indo-Pakistan border will compound the confusion in the battle field. For instance, Prithvi will be a strategic weapon when deployed in the Amritsar district, as Lahore, the emotional capital of Pakistan, will come within range. Similarly, the 40 km radius complex consisting of Rawalpindi, Islamabad, Wah, Kamra and Chaklala, is strategic targeting. With major Pakistani build-up expected in the vicinity, Prithvi also becomes an operational weapon to hit important communication nodal points and rail road junctions deep inside Pakistan. However Prithvi becomes a tactical weapon when employed in the Thar.

The doctrinal shift in the subcontinent, brought by the induction of large quantities of Prithvis, will be one from seeking territorial gains to destroying the enemy's very infrastructure which supports these army reserves. The infrastructure could be economic targeting, like power stations, gas and oil installations and oil tank parks.

—From *The Asian Age*

Writer Cites Indications Prithvi Already Deployed

94WP0115A Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA
in English 22 Jun 94 pp 1, 15

[Article by Manoj Joshi: "Western Border Sites: Prithvi May Have Been Deployed"]

[Text] New Delhi, June 21.

India may have already carried out a static deployment of a regiment's worth of Prithvi tactical battlefield support missiles, even while, at a public level, it is battling pressures to prevent its induction into the Indian Army.

There are indications that the missiles may be already available for launch from select sites in the western border. The aim of this, strictly interim and even ad hoc deployment is to serve as a deterrent against the possible use by Pakistan of its own Hatf-I and Hatf-II missiles which have been deployed in 1991 and 1993 respectively and have ranges of 70 and 280 km.

How close a missile lands to its target depends on how accurately its point of launch is determined. Since the army intends to integrate the Prithvi missile mounted on a Tartra truck as a battlefield support weapons system into its Corps artillery formations, special survey equipment mounted on trucks will be used to determine the point of launch.

However, in the current strictly interim deployment the sites have been pre-surveyed and their targets already determined.

The Indian Army plans are to integrate this as a mobile system which would use its devastating punch to prevent the adversary's second echelon forces from reaching the front through accurate strikes on airfields, fuel and ammunition dumps, railway marshalling yards, bridges and, more important, the manoeuvre forces themselves with pre-fragmented warheads or even more advanced "sense and destroy armour" bomblets.

The Prithvi with a one-tonne warload will therefore serve the same function as the U.S. Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) which carries a 500 kg warhead to 135 km.

As for nuclear warheads, it is well known that a 500 kg payload is sufficient to carry a 100-200 kilo tonne yield weapon. Most observers accept that while India has the ability to make nuclear weapons, and has even fabricated some of them, none of them have been transferred to the armed forces. It is unlikely that New Delhi would allow an army field formation to keep such weapons, which are essentially of a strategic and political nature, even were it to decide that it needs an overt deployment of nuclear weapons.

Locating the target and sending back information to the launch control centre (target acquisition) at the long-range would be carried out by remotely piloted vehicles (RPV). While the DRDO's [Defense Research Development Organization] Aeronautical Development Establishment is at the last stages of developing one such vehicle, the army is believed to have placed an order with an Israeli firm for a dozen or more RPVs for immediate use.

Last year media reports suggested that sites were being prepared for this deployment and this resulted in a demarche by the U.S. and several western nations calling on India and Pakistan to desist from any deployments.

Earlier this year, the subject was again raised during the visit of the Deputy Secretary of State, Mr. Strobe Talbott. In fact officials accompanying Mr. Talbott said that the "imminent" deployment of missiles in the subcontinent were spurring their efforts for seeking regional arrangements to forestall the eventuality. Last week, this theme was repeated by the U.S. Ambassador-designate, Mr. Frank Wisner, who said that the U.S. wanted India to "consider very carefully" whether it ought to deploy the Prithvi.

After showing that it would not wilt before U.S. pressure by carrying out two tests in quick succession, India can afford to listen to what the U.S. has to say. But in turn it must also protest against the tendency of U.S. interlocutors to introduce a "spin" into their arguments which try to put India into the wrong.

For example, Mr. Wisner has been cited as stating that the Prithvi was "exactly the kind of thing you would build if you had a primitive nuclear weapon to deploy."

What becomes clear is the U.S. concern over the consequences of the deployment in Pakistan. There is a belief that this will touch off a race for ballistic missiles in the subcontinent which, if nuclear tipped will enhance the danger of nuclear war. That there is a tendency to exaggerate this danger is accepted now even in the U.S.

It is well worth the effort to sit down and patiently explain to the U.S. that the purpose of the Prithvi, as indeed the entire Indian military deployment, is not to attack Pakistan but to deter a Pakistani attack on India.

This is best indicated by the fact that for the "short war" scenario, the only one that both sides logically plan towards, Indian and Pakistani ground forces are roughly equal. Both have three strike corps headed by an armoured/mechanised division each. These are the formations around which the deterrent capability of the armies are built. Though the IAF [Indian Air Force] outnumbers the PAF [Pakistan Air Force], the latter has, in recent years improved its standing relative to the former.

Access To Safe Nuclear Technologies Denied

94WP0114A Calcutta *THE STATESMAN*
in English 16 Jun 94 p 5

[First paragraph is introductory paragraph]

[Text] The Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) said that the denial of safety technologies, however, has not in any way been a constraint.

New Delhi, June 15.—India's refusal to sign the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has not only prevented it from getting nuclear fuel for the Tarapur station, but advanced nations of the Nuclear Suppliers' Club have also denied it access to the latest technologies, necessary for the safety of nuclear plants, reports PTI [Press Trust of India].

Revealing this in an official report, the Department of Atomic Energy, said that the denial of safety technologies, however, has not in anyway been a constraint as India is capable of finding a solution to safety related problems on its own.

The DAE said the need for seeking assistance from outside does not arise as it has sufficient expertise in safe operation of heavy water reactors.

"But we keep in touch with the latest trends through participation in international conferences and meetings, arranged by the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA]".

The safety culture and high standards at Indian nuclear establishments had been praised by the IAEA's own safety chief, the DAE said.

The DAE said India was able to develop competence to deal with safety issues because of strong safety research.

Minister Tells Plans for Delivering Cryogenic Engines

94WP0110A Bombay *THE TIMES OF INDIA*
in English 27 May 94 p 1

[Text] New Delhi, May 26. Russia will supply seven cryogenic engines to India and the first one would be delivered in 1996, according to the Russian first deputy foreign minister, Mr. Anatoly Adamishin, reports UNI [United News of India].

In an interview to UNI-TV during his visit here last week, which was telecast by Doordarshan today, Mr. Adamishin said under the terms of a recent agreement with India, the technology for the cryogenic engines, used in rocket launching, would not be transferred to India as envisaged in the earlier contract.

He said the engines would be sold to India as and when required.

Mr. Adamishin, who was here to discuss the dates of the Prime Minister, Mr. P.V. Narasimha Rao's, visit to Moscow, expected in the second half of next month, said the two countries were likely to sign a comprehensive agreement on cooperation in the field of space.

In reply to a question, Mr. Adamishin said Russia had started supplying spares for India's defence equipment it had bought from the erstwhile Soviet Union.

He added that the two countries were discussing a proposal to set up joint ventures to manufacture military spares for the requirement of India and other countries which had Soviet military hardware.

Asked whether Pakistan had raised the issue of Russian military supplies during his discussions in Islamabad before coming here, Mr. Adamishin said the issue did come up but his government had not taken any decision on cooperation in defence matters with Pakistan.

Answering a question about non-proliferation, the Russian minister said his government fully supported the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and wanted to strengthen it both regionally and globally.

Asked to comment on India's global approach on nuclear non-proliferation as opposed to a regional one, Mr. Adamishin said it was better to have a treaty than not to have and, added, that his country favoured more countries signing it.

Mr. Adamishin said Mr. Rao's visit to Russia would give a boost to the economic ties between two countries which had to adopt a new approach because the economic relations were earlier dealt with at the governmental level.

He said the level of the bilateral economic relationship was "not rosy." He underlined the need to take fresh measures to expand their relations taking into account the changes in the economic policies.

IRAN

Velayati Denies Missile Work With DPRK

OW1107152194 Tokyo *KYODO* in English
1500 GMT 11 Jul 94

[Text] Tehran, July 11 *KYODO*—Iranian Foreign Minister 'Ali Akbar Velayati said Monday [11 July] that Iran does not think there will be "any dramatic change" in the foreign policy of North Korea following the death of Kim Il-song last Friday.

Velayati, in an interview with Japanese media based in Tehran, also denied that Iran is cooperating with North Korea in developing long-range surface-to-surface missiles, adding that there are no North Korean military experts in Iran.

Velayati said cooperation between the two countries is not against any other country.

Regarding a statement from the Group of Seven (G-7) economic powers at their weekend Naples summit, which called on Iran to have more participation in international peace efforts, he said it is exactly Iran's policy and that Iran's efforts in Afghanistan and Tajikistan are proof of that.

Velayati also denied allegations by Britain that Iran is supporting the Irish Republican Army and said that such allegations stem from "internal problems of the British Government."

PAKISTAN

U.S. Pressure on Nuclear Program Viewed

NC2606145794 Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI
in Persian 21 Jun 94 pp 15, 14

[Unattributed commentary: "White House Bullying and Pakistan's Resistance"]

[Excerpts] In 10 days, that is, on 1 July, the U.S. Administration is to officially stop all economic aid to Pakistan. This decision was published in the WASHINGTON TIMES following the approval of an amendment on a foreign aid bill by Congress stating that all U.S. economic and military aid to Pakistan will be stopped. The reason that has been given for this decision is that Pakistan is continuing its nuclear programs. This decision may end the three decades of close economic and military cooperation between America and Pakistan.

As was foreseeable, immediately after announcing the severance of all U.S. economic and military aid to Pakistan, Washington started its new phase of pressures by requesting that a delegation be sent to inspect Pakistan's nuclear installations. This request was strongly refused by the Pakistani president.

Announcing his country's decision to refuse the request, Pakistani President Sardar Farooq Ahmad Khan Leghari stated: Pakistan does not intend to jeopardize its security by revealing its nuclear programs.

U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Strobe Talbott has said that the delivery of 38 F-16's, which have been paid for by Pakistan, is contingent on an inspection of Pakistan's nuclear installations. In an interview with a number of Pakistani journalists in Islamabad, the Pakistani president said that his country has told the United States that Pakistan rejects the proposal to inspect its nuclear installations and stressed that in order to prevent the proliferation of nuclear arms in South Asia, a solution that satisfies regional conditions should be sought and that no problem can be solved through bullying.

Leghari added: Pakistan has asked America to exercise a just policy in order to succeed in preventing the proliferation of nuclear arms in South Asia.

Last week the Americans informed the Pakistani Government of their imminent decision to sever their \$56-million aid to that country. This comes at a time when Pakistan needed only \$50 million more to complete some of its current nuclear projects.

The end of the Cold War, the death of communism, and naturally the diminishing strategic value of countries like Turkey and Pakistan may have been the reason for the severance of American aid to Islamabad. It is even possible that the gradual pro-American inclinations in India and the drop in Pakistan's significance for America or even both these factors together led to the decision that continued military and economic assistance to Pakistan was unnecessary. At any rate, the truth is that the issue of nuclear arms has caused the deteriorated Islamabad-Washington relations.

It is years now since Pakistan's nuclear activities have become a major issue in joint U.S.-Pakistani relations. But in confronting this crisis, the Pakistani officials have always repeated their firm stance on two issues—the denial that they manufacture nuclear arms on the one hand and the insistence on continuing peaceful nuclear activities on the other. [passage omitted]

Pakistani officials have always refuted reports on their efforts to obtain the nuclear bomb. But they have always defended their nuclear programs which they claim to be for peaceful purposes. In the fall last year Mrs. Bhutto was re-elected prime minister for the second time and at a news conference on 17 April this year, she very explicitly stressed that Pakistan has no intention whatsoever, of halting its nuclear program. She clarified that her country will also not tolerate any foreign pressure in relation to this. Before her, the Pakistani Defense Minister Aftab Shaban Mirani had said that Pakistan does not have a nuclear bomb but that it will not remain weak so as to allow any aggression against its territorial integrity.

American officials are especially afraid that technical and military contacts and cooperation may be established between Pakistan and North Korea, which are both firmly resisting the White House's bullying. North Korea was among the countries that Mrs. Bhutto visited immediately after her victory in the elections last year. Even though the Pakistanis refute reports on the existence of nuclear arms and efforts to manufacture these arms in their country, it is believed there that as long as India—as the historical enemy of Pakistan—has nuclear arms and is confronting Pakistan's policies and posing as a potential threat on Pakistan's borders, the idea of producing similar arms in Pakistan is not illogical.

That is one side of the reality. The other is that the Pakistanis believe that there is no logic and justice when it comes to the issue of nuclear disarmament in the world's critical areas. The Pakistanis, like many

other people, believe that the existence or non-existence of nuclear arms should be a general and international issue and not limited to a specific geographic area in the world.

At any rate, the Pakistanis feel a lack of security on their eastern borders. It is the right of each government to defend its country's national sovereignty and to create all the necessary means to defend itself despite global pressures. If international laws are to be respected, they should be respected by everyone. A government should not be expected to respect a law when it knows and sees that others are not respecting it. In our world today we should not have people who only give advice and expect others to listen and to obey.

If the strategy of "global disarmament" or "a world free of nuclear arms" which have been the slogans and doctrines of statesmen who dominated the post-Cold War world is a general, global, and unbiased strategy, then this strategy and doctrine should find ways to be applicable and to rise before those governments that do not consider any limitations to their right to use mass murder weapons.

Any lack of attention to this basic need can naturally pave the way for the manufacture of such arms in another part of the world as a deterrent and defensive action.

For half a century, in justifying the growing trend of their annual military expenditures, the Americans propounded the threat of communism or the threat of their rival power. By magnifying this "threat" they tried to legally mask the production of various types of nuclear arms and mass murder weapons. If this logic is acceptable, other governments in the world too have the right—each according to its specific extent—to use this method. Definitely the outcome of this political stance and this American logic was that more and more such arms have been manufactured for four decades by the other pole. This was a perfectly natural phenomenon in that it is not as though only one side has the right to arm itself against its enemy while others do not. If the American democrats do not understand this, it is better for them to once again examine their predecessor's record and the outcome of their military doctrine on the international scene during the past decades.

'Reliable Sources' Say Anza Missile Program To Resume

BK1907135394 Islamabad PAKISTAN
in Urdu 19 Jul 94 p 10

[Editorial: "Pakistan Will Produce the Anza-11 Missile"]

[Text] Citing reliable sources, our staff reporter in Islamabad says that Pakistan will resume the Anza-11 missile program with Chinese assistance. Pakistan suspended work on the Anza series of missiles in early 1991 under intense U.S. pressure. The United States had alleged that

Pakistan supplied Stinger missile technology to China. Following the U.S. allegation, Pakistan stopped production of the missile, which was being done in collaboration with the PRC China, of course, continued work on the missile and produced a surface-to-air missile called the Green Arrow. During the Chinese defense minister's current visit, Pakistan will ask China to transfer this missile technology. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto said in Multan that a missile race will begin in the South Asian subcontinent unless the world community forces India to abandon its missile program.

India is now producing three missiles—Prithvi, Agni, and Akash. The Prithvi missile is being deployed along the Line of Control in occupied Kashmir and on Pakistan's borders. Pakistan will have to counter it; obviously, there is no alternative but to produce a missile. The prime minister has made it clear that Pakistan is capable of defending itself in the face of the Indian missile program. Pakistan's scientists and technologists possess the best capabilities.

The only way that India can be prevented from producing and acquiring weapons of mass destruction is to bring international pressure to bear and devise ways to discourage its passion for amassing weapons. If this is not done, Pakistan will be left with no alternative and will be forced to join the missile race to ensure its own defense.

Bhutto Says Nuclear Program Not Weapons-Oriented

BK0707102094 Islamabad Radio Pakistan Network
in Urdu 0200 GMT 7 Jul 94

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted]

On the nuclear issue, Benazir Bhutto said Pakistan firmly believes in meeting the objectives of a complete elimination of nuclear weapons. She affirmed that Pakistan's nuclear program is entirely peaceful and not weapons-oriented. The prime minister made it clear that despite possessing technical capability, Pakistan has decided not to produce nuclear weapons. She reiterated the Pakistan's view that nuclear proliferation may threaten international peace and security. In this regard, she said Pakistan has put forward a number of bilateral and regional proposals. This includes the proposal to declare South Asia a nuclear weapons-free zone and a five-nation conference to elaborate the regional nonproliferation regime. She said India has rejected all these proposals because it was working to become a major nuclear weapon state with a large nuclear arsenal along with sophisticated delivery system.

About economic policies of the government, the prime minister said we are following the Islamic concept of social justice. She said the dynamics of our society now warrant a very definite and perceptible shift to private enterprise.

President Asserts Nation Opposes Nuclear Proliferation

BK2406135494 Peshawar THE FRONTIER POST in English 24 Jun 94 p 1

[Report by Muhammad Ismail]

[Text] Islamabad—President Sardar Farooq Ahmed Khan Leghari Thursday said the criticism of national institutions like armed forces and judiciary by the opposition leaders was "most unfortunate".

Responding to journalists questions at the inaugural function of Nathiagali Summer College here, the president said armed forces fully knew their responsibilities which they were fulfilling in accordance with the constitution and democratic system.

The president was happy with the role being played by the armed forces. When a journalist said that those elements criticising the armed forces wanted army's interference in politics, Leghari dispelled such impression saying "there was no danger of any such interference."

Asked about the need for a new legislation to check the criticism of the national institutions, including the armed forces, the president said: "Though the criticism was unfortunate but there are sufficient laws to deal with such criticism. However, if the government and legislators feel the need of more legislation, they can do the same", he pointed out.

The president said continued dialogue between the opposition and government were a must for the functioning of the democratic system, Leghari said in his capacity as the president of Pakistan. It was his duty to help create harmony between the opposition and government: "It is important for democratic system to function. There should be dialogue between the government and opposition all the times", the president said adding "it will be his endeavour to create conditions to enable the democratic process to function.

When reminded of the increased Indian defence budget, the president said: "we are also meeting Pakistan's defence needs".

Asked about the Indian's alleged plan of a "limited war" against Pakistan, the president said: "Armed forces, government and people of Pakistan are fully capable of defending their motherland". "We know how to defend our country and our forces are fully capable to safeguard our frontiers", he concluded.

Earlier, inaugurating the 19th International Nathiagali Summer College on physics and contemporary needs, the president said the freedom of thought and expression was a must for the promotion of science. A democratic order which guarantees freedom, provides a fertile soil for nurturing of science, he added. Repressive societies are not only intolerant of new ideas but in fact force creative minds to seek refuge in free societies which are

more congenial and receptive to new ideas and initiatives, he added. He urged the scientists to strive to set up liberal and democratic traditions to discuss and debate the economic and technological problems facing the country and work out strategies to put Pakistan on a path of accelerated technological development. The president said systematic dialogue between leading scientists, technological experts, academicians and government functionaries had been initiated by him at the presidency and that he himself participated in the discussion.

Nuclear programme: The president said Pakistan would continue to pursue its peaceful nuclear programme. "We are against nuclear proliferation and have no intention to develop nuclear weapons. Our government is firmly committed to establishing an equitable, non-discriminatory and non-proliferation regime in South Asia. Leghari said Pakistan had put forward several proposals for NPT in the South Asia but unfortunately India had not responded positively. "Pakistan will welcome and cooperate on any future proposal but its security concerns must be taken into account," he added.

The president said Pakistan's nuclear programme was designed to help improve living standards of our people. We are in the process of setting up a major nuclear-based power plant at Chashma with the Chinese help. We will like to set up more nuclear power plants under IAEA safeguards, he added.

Leghari said Pakistan was determined to press into service science and technology to make progress and provide reasonable living standards to its people. For this purpose he said, the government had doubled the allocation for science and increased the education budget by 45 percent. But this is not sufficient and more resources will have to be diverted for human resource development, he maintained.

Earlier, Dr. Ishfaq Ahmed, chairman of Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission presented the address of welcome.

Man Arrested for Spying on Nuclear Plant; Linked With India

BK2606095094 Islamabad KHABRAIN in Urdu 26 Jun 94 PP 1, 6

[Text] Rawalpindi—It has been learned from informed sources that a sensitive agency of the Pakistani Army has arrested in a dramatic fashion the owner of Raja's Clinic, which is located at (Kler Chowk) in Kahuta, on charges of espionage in connection with the Kahuta nuclear plant. At the time of arrest, the clinic owner was sending messages through a special transmitter. The accused is said to have links with the Indian intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing. According to the sources, the revelations made by the accused during preliminary investigations have shocked the country's law enforcement agencies. The accused was on the blacklist of the intelligence agencies for quite some time. He was arrested in a surprise raid the other day. Details of his revelations have yet to be revealed.

RUSSIA

KGB Source Says Pyongyang Developed Nuclear Detonator

SK2406113994 Seoul YONHAP in English
1129 GMT 24 Jun 94

[Text] Tokyo, June 24 (YONHAP)—The former Soviet Union's KGB believed back in 1990 that North Korea already secured a nuclear detonator, the SANKEI SHIMBUN here said in a dispatch from Moscow on Friday.

Quoting a story appearing in the Friday evening issue of IZVESTYA, SANKEI said the report filed by KGB to Soviet leadership in February 1990 said in part, "North Korea already has its first nuclear detonator and is simply withholding its test to keep it a secret."

The KGB report said that it had obtained from a reliable source the information that North Korea was indulging in research on the production of nuclear weapons in a bid to maintain a military edge over South Korea and join the group of nuclear countries.

Explaining about difference between "nuclear detonator" and "nuclear bomb," IZVESTYA reportedly said the existence of a nuclear detonator means there are nuclear weapons.

The contents of the report have high credibility as it was prepared by Col. V.L. Smolinov of 16th department of KGB's Second General Bureau, IZVESTYA added.

Stolen Uranium Discovered in Chelyabinsk

5.5 Kilograms Found

LD0607120994 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1117 GMT 6 Jul 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Yevgeniy Tkachenko]

[Text] Chelyabinsk July 6 TASS—The Russian counter-intelligence officers found 5.5 kilogrammes of non-enriched uranium-238 which had been stolen from the Russian Federal Nuclear Centre near Chelyabinsk in the Urals. The hiding place was discovered in the city of Snezhinsk in Chelyabinsk region. The uranium has been returned to the nuclear centre, TASS was told on Wednesday by the press service of the Chelyabinsk counter-intelligence agency.

The uranium was found during the investigation of a theft of platinum which had been stolen from the same nuclear centre. In spring police arrested an employee of its technical physics research institute who tried to sell 130 grams of platinum for 1,200 US dollars. The investigation of the case led to the uranium find.

Group Charged With Theft

LD0807102894 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
0830 GMT 8 Jul 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Olga Semyonova]

[Text] Moscow July 8 TASS—On July 6, department of the Federal Counterintelligence Service (FSK) for the Chelyabinsk region reportedly discovered and returned the 5.5 kilograms of uranium-238 stolen from the Snezhinsk-based Federal Nuclear Centre.

According to well-informed FSK sources, policemen and counterintelligence officers in Snezhinsk found the stolen uranium in a hiding place unexpectedly during an investigation into a shortage of precious metals at the Federal Nuclear Centre.

They unmasked a criminal group which dealt in stealing platinum from a certain research institute. When the uranium was found, it was revealed that the thieves just took it along with the platinum. The thieves, who intended to make lots of money with the "radioactive element", were unaware that uranium-238 is completely unsuitable for military purposes.

The Snezhinsk-based prosecutor's office brought a criminal charge of theft of radioactive materials against the arrested in accordance with Article 223, Paragraph 3 of the criminal code of the Russian Federation. They may have to serve three to ten years of imprisonment with or without confiscation of their belongings.

Radio on DPRK Agreeing To Freeze Nuclear Program

SK2406114394 Moscow Radio Moscow in Korean
1000 GMT 23 Jun 94

[From the "Focus on Asia" program]

[Text] The DPRK declared that it is willing to freeze its nuclear program [haek kangnyong] and has informed the United States. U.S. President Bill Clinton said during North Korean-U.S. talks, Pyongyang will not conduct refueling operations at its reactor in Yongbyon or reprocess [kagong] waste fuel accumulated at the reactor.

International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] experts stationed in North Korea will remain at its nuclear facilities [haek taesang]. Responding to Pyongyang's freezing of its nuclear program, Washington said that it will resume high-level talks with the DPRK. The United States will not bring up the issue of economic sanctions against the DPRK at the UN Security Council.

The acute situation over the DPRK nuclear program has remarkably been eased. The situation was extremely aggravated by Pyongyang's refusal of a complete inspection of its nuclear facilities [haek taesange taehan sacharul wanjon surakhaji anatkko] and its declaration on withdrawing from the IAEA.

Recent changes in the situation do not mean that a way to the complete solution of the North Korean nuclear problem has been found, but necessary conditions for a solution to the problem have been prepared.

The international community wants to assure that weapons of mass destruction are not being produced on the Korean peninsula. Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev said: If Pyongyang's attempt to possess nuclear weapons is ignored, other countries will try to possess nuclear weapons, following Pyongyang as a model case. Its neighboring countries, such as the ROK and Japan, will actively be engaged in developing nuclear weapons.

Therefore, Russia cannot help but carefully watch the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula. The situation in Northeast Asia will be normalized only when Pyongyang's nuclear program is clarified. Anyhow, Pyongyang's statement on freezing its nuclear program will make South-North dialogue possible. A South-North meeting is already under discussion. The easing of tensions will make it possible to hold an international conference on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

Facts, Conjecture on DPRK N-Program Cited

MM1507103194 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 13 Jul 94 p 3

[Article by Mikhail Morozov under the "Sensation?" rubric: "It Has Not Yet Been Possible To Find a Nuclear Bomb in the Dark Dungeon"]

[Text] The topic of North Korea's nuclear efforts is as scandalous as it is confused. Every side that has been dragged into the conflict is pursuing its own objectives, confusing the situation, and politicizing it to an extreme degree. Even if we gather together all the available information, it is impossible to provide an unambiguous answer to the question of whether the Koreans have a bomb or whether they can develop one. But nevertheless we must try to inject some clarity into the matter. Regarding the history of the issue.

In 1985 U.S. official spokesmen announced for the first time that they had intelligence data proving that a secret nuclear reactor was being built 90 km north of Pyongyang near the small town of Yongbyon. In July 1990 THE WASHINGTON POST reported that new satellite photographs showed the presence in Yongbyon of a structure which could possibly be used to separate plutonium from nuclear fuel. In September 1989 the London magazine JANE'S DEFENCE WEEKLY stated that North Korea "could manufacture nuclear devices in five years' time, and the means to deliver them soon afterward."

The Americans have claimed throughout that they have irrefutable proof of work being carried out in the DPRK to develop a nuclear bomb. This claim is based on photographs taken from space which, however, the Americans have not been quick to publish.

Back in 1977 the DPRK concluded an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], allowing the latter to inspect a research reactor which was built with the assistance of the USSR. In 1985, under pressure from our country, Pyongyang acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. We may therefore surmise that even back then U.S. suspicions were not entirely justified. Their statements about Korean guile did not mention that the installation at Yongbyon had been known about for eight years from official IAEA reports. Moreover, the possibility of using the equipment and materials supplied by the USSR for military purposes was practically ruled out, since under the agreement all information about these supplies was relayed to the IAEA immediately. In response to Western suspicions, Pyongyang confirmed in 1990 that another research reactor was being constructed at Yongbyon which was being used to study the peaceful uses of atomic energy. For a long time, however, the DPRK did not sign a verification agreement with the IAEA, thereby earning itself a more favorable position in international politics, and nor did it allow all the installations at Yongbyon to be inspected.

Who Benefits?

Many people benefit by whipping up a hullabaloo around the nuclear weapons that are allegedly being developed in the DPRK. In the United States such claims are built almost exclusively on data supplied by the CIA and the military, who are understandably inclined to exaggerate the capabilities of a potential adversary. The same tendency can be observed in Seoul, where there are fears of losing the U.S. nuclear umbrella. If necessary, Japan could use the argument of the nuclear threat posed by the DPRK to force the pace of its own military programs. To a certain extent this is also favorable to Pyongyang, since it increases its international weight and allows it to take up a more advantageous stance in talks with Japan and the United States.

Soviet Aid

Under the cooperation agreement concluded between the USSR and the DPRK, a nuclear research center was constructed near the small town of Yongbyon. In 1965 a Soviet IRT-2M research reactor was assembled for this center. From 1965 through 1973 fuel (fuel elements) enriched to 10 percent was supplied to the DPRK for this reactor. In 1974 Korean specialists independently modernized this reactor in the same way that other reactors operating in the USSR and other countries had been modernized, bringing its capacity up to 8 megawatts and switching to fuel enriched to 80 percent. Subsequently, the degree of fuel enrichment was reduced. During the entire period that this IRT-2M reactor was in operation, approximately 40 kg of fuel in terms of the basic fissionable material—U-235—were supplied to the DPRK. According to information from the Ministry of Atomic Energy, the delivery volumes of this fuel were in line with the normal requirements for this type of reactor. In other words, there was no "spare"

fuel. This research reactor was monitored by the IAEA. (The agreement between the DPRK and the IAEA came into force 20 July 1977, according to IAEA information report CIRK/252 dated 28 September 1977.) It was inspected by experts from the agency twice a year.

In 1979 the DPRK asked Soviet organizations to sell it fuel for a nuclear testing installation which had been developed independently by Korean specialists at Pyongyang University. This request was refused, because the USSR only sold nuclear fuel for equipment made in this country. This installation was also registered by the IAEA. The USSR supplied the DPRK with no other materials or equipment.

Some 50 North Korean nuclear scientists were trained in Soviet nuclear centers, principally at Dubna near Moscow.

From 1989 through 1991 specialists from the Ministry of Atomic Power conducted design and survey work to choose a site for a nuclear electric power station. This work was conducted slowly since it was complicated by political and economic problems in both countries. Then, owing to a lack of money, the work was suspended.

The Korean Nuclear Program

V.N. Mikhaylov, director of the Soviet nuclear weapons program and current head of the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy, stated unequivocally two years ago that "the USSR's nuclear weapons complex never had any connection with a possible program for developing nuclear weapons in the DPRK. We do not monitor any work they may be doing in this sphere. As a specialist I believe that, taking into account the level of development of North Korean industry, it would be impossible to develop a bomb there, at least in the near future, owing to the complexities of a technological nature." He has not changed his opinion to this day.

In Yongbyon, in addition to the research reactor and a 50-megawatt reactor currently under construction, there is a radiochemical laboratory, a plant for manufacturing fuel rods, and a storage facility for these rods. IAEA experts also harbor definite suspicions with regard to these facilities, especially as the Korean specialists, the IAEA experts claim, have already passed them unreliable information.

The director of one Ministry of Atomic Energy firm has expressed the opinion that there are theoretically other ways of accumulating the requisite quantity of a substance with military applications. For example, it is possible to chemically enrich uranium ores. Therefore it is necessary to check the sites where natural uranium is processed near the cities of Suncheon and Pyongsan, which have always been closed to foreigners, including Soviets. According to a Russian specialist who wished to remain anonymous, uranium extraction in these regions has been going on since the 1960's.

A military man who worked for many years in Korea told me that all Korean installations that are seriously engaged in defense work are sited deep in the mountains in areas inaccessible to outsiders, and if the Koreans had plants for manufacturing nuclear weapons components, no specialist would be able to establish their location. The same source believes that the Koreans possibly once had plans to develop their own nuclear weapons, but after encountering major difficulties they probably decided to rely on a missile program and establish a modern air force based on Soviet MiG-29's. This is the weapon which would probably pose the biggest danger to South Korea.

As is well known, nuclear ordnance becomes a weapon if there is a delivery system for it. According to claims in the Western press, missiles of the Nodong family with a range of around 1,000 km are already in service in the DPRK. But nobody has seen these missiles up close. On the other hand, it is known that North Korea's missile potential is based on obsolete missiles developed from Soviet Scuds. These represent 1950's Soviet missile design, and they could not even theoretically deliver a nuclear warhead (if such a thing could be produced in the DPRK) developed at the technological level of the initial period of nuclear research. Incidentally, there is a theory that claims that the DPRK is secretly buying up low-grade nuclear raw material in third countries and making warheads from it. This claim is as absurd as the other fabrications about the Korean potential. Such a "warhead" would weigh hundreds of tonnes. And the world's most powerful rocket—the Saturn—could carry only 135 tonnes.

Where Did These Developments Come From?

Over the past few years the United States has been constantly whipping up the situation by issuing statements about progress in the Korean nuclear program. The DPRK, exploiting this, delayed signing an inspection agreement with the IAEA. An agreement was finally signed, and international experts examined the installations indicated by the U.S. satellites, but found nothing dangerous. Then new facilities were required so as to be able to whip things up further. The DPRK, joining the Non-Proliferation Treaty under pressure from the United States, the USSR, China, and other countries, was nonetheless hoping to strengthen its security—and in this respect Pyongyang's arguments are convincing.

The North Koreans, in pledging not to produce nuclear weapons, demanded their removal from the south of the peninsula and the organization of joint inter-Korean inspections of nuclear facilities in the north and south. Nothing of the sort transpired, and the Americans continue to hold the annual Team Spirit exercises, which rehearse offensive operations using nuclear weapons.

On the other hand, the IAEA pressure plays into Pyongyang's hands. By distracting the people's attention with an outside threat it gives it a chance to survive at a time when its economic position is very difficult and it is internationally isolated.

Pyongyang's step may also show that the DPRK has to a considerable extent been "cornered" and that further pressure on it will not be effective. The statement on its possible withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty was a signal that the United States and its allies would do well to ease the pressure on Pyongyang—which, from the standpoint of having nuclear weapons, is less of a danger to the world community than Pakistan or other "threshold states."

Observers' Opinions

It follows from Russian Foreign Ministry official statements that Moscow is siding with the U.S. position—albeit with some reservations. At the same time, many Russian Foreign Ministry staffers are privately saying that their department has no doubt that the Koreans lack nuclear warheads and the technological conditions for their production, and they also believe that the development of a nuclear weapons delivery vehicle in the DPRK is no less of a problem. One senior Foreign Ministry official working in the DPRK expressed the view that North Korea's lack of nuclear weapons means that there is no need to rush into imposing international sanctions on Pyongyang, which would merely help to bolster the Kim Il-song regime within the country.

A South Korean diplomat, who, for understandable reasons, wished to remain anonymous, expressed the view that, in the event of a decision to go for some kind of strong-arm measures against the DPRK, the United States and its allies would encounter hitherto unprecedented anti-American sentiments throughout the Korean Peninsula, including South Korea. A sense of nationalism would prevail over political considerations not only in public opinion but even among the South Korean elite.

In the view of a ranking French diplomat, turning the IAEA into a tool of international policy wielded by one group of countries (albeit Security Council members) will inevitably lead to a loss of confidence on the part of smaller countries and is unlikely to promote the resolution of the tasks facing this organization.

Aide on 'Extremely Reliable' Security Measures for N-Arms

PM3006194594 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 1 Jul 94 p 1

[Report by Vadim Markushin: "Criminals Will Not Get Their Hands on Our Nuclear Bomb"]

[Text] If anyone thinks that he is already living in the era of a radically reduced nuclear threat, he cannot be thinking seriously. That was the thrust of what CIA

Director James Woolsey said the other day. In his opinion, nuclear warheads could be a target for the Russian mafia's criminal trade.

Another U.S. department—the FBI—is also seriously concerned about the problem of preventing the theft of nuclear weapons. FBI Director Louis Freeh and a number of other high-ranking U.S. Administration representatives are arriving in Moscow 2 July to put forward a concrete plan of joint actions to combat organized crime.

Just how real is the possibility that Russian terrorists will be able to seize nuclear warheads if they really want to?

Answering this question, Academician Sergey Zelentsov, a consultant to the Russian Federation Defense Ministry, said:

"The system for the protection of nuclear munitions is echeloned and extremely reliable. Access to them is multilayered. It is virtually impossible for outsiders to get to the warheads. The transport of nuclear munitions is also properly organized. There are special formations in a high state of readiness to thwart any attempt to seize them. To date there has not been a single loss from the nuclear arsenals."

FCIS Detains Group for Trying To Sell Uranium Dioxide

LD0706181694 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1356 GMT 7 Jun 94

[Text] Employees of the St. Petersburg Department of Russia's Federal Counterintelligence Service (FCIS) to combat terrorism have conducted an investigation and detained a group of people who intended to sell more than three kilograms of uranium dioxide (the share of uranium-235 isotopes is 90%).

The people involved in this case were detained early March after the first information was received by the FCIS. Leader of the Department's press service Yevgeniy Lukin underlined in his interview with Interfax that during this month employees of the service managed to reveal all places where this strategic material was kept and not to lose even a gram of this material which presents radioactive danger.

A total of 3.05 kilograms of powder were confiscated, part of it was kept under conditions presenting danger primarily for the life and health of the criminals and their relatives. They kept it in a glass pot and a metal retort.

Decontamination operations were conducted in one of the suburbs of St. Petersburg where the powder was kept. A butcher of a food shop and a plumber were among the people who tried to sell this strategic raw material.

Employees of the St. Petersburg Department established that the uranium was stolen from one of the enterprises belonging to the Automobile Industry Ministry and situated near Moscow. The case which was instituted in accordance with Article 223, part 3 of the Criminal Code—robbery of radioactive materials - was transferred to the prosecutor's office to St. Petersburg for further investigation.

The FCIS does not rule out that the stolen uranium-235 can be sold abroad. According to some estimates, the price of one gram of this substance which is used in atomic industry is 300 dollars.

The press service of the St. Petersburg department reported that the president was informed about this case by a special report.

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